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 Introduction  
This chapter is about the process of change in the Telecommunications 
(Telecoms) Industry. More specifically, in this chapter the interrelated causes 
of change are analysed that led, in the first place, to the transformation of 
the Old Telecoms Industry into the New Telecoms Industry and then, almost 
simultaneously, to the latter’s metamorphosis into the Info-communications 
Industry.   
The demise of the Old Telecoms Industry began in the mid-1980s when, 
due to different combinations of political-economic circumstances, the 
monopoly of telecoms was ended in the US, UK and Japan. By the late-
1990s, with the agreement of the European Union to fully liberalise its 
telecoms markets and the similar agreement of the WTO, there was a 
widespread consensus that the liberalisation of telecoms is essential. The 
roots of change that gave birth to the New Telecoms Industry in the early-
1990s, however, as this chapter will show, were far more fundamental than 
the political and regulatory decisions that finally legitimised the changes.  In 
the 1990s a new set of influences, that had begun thirty years earlier in an 
initially unrelated set of activities, brought about fundamental changes that 
further transformed the Telecoms Industry into the Info-communications 
Industry. These influences came from the Internet based on its triad of core 
technologies: packet-switching, Internet Protocol (IP), and the World Wide 
Web. 
Despite important contributions made by earlier economists, such as 
Alfred Marshall and Joseph Schumpeter, it is reasonable to conclude that we 
do not yet have a comprehensive theory of the dynamics of industry capable 
 
(*) This paper will appear as a chapter in the author’s forthcoming book, Telecoms in the 
Internet Age. 
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of explaining the process of change in specific industries, even though an 
increasingly rich body of knowledge is emerging in this area (1). Indeed, it 
could even be conjectured that the search for such a comprehensive theory 
would inevitably be wrecked on the rocks of complexity and diversity. Under 
these circumstances a valuable purpose is served by detailed accounts of 
the evolution of particular industries which focus specifically on what 
Schumpeter called the 'engine' (2) of change (3). What this engine consists 
of then becomes a key problem in the analysis. In the concluding section 
several observations are made regarding the relevance of the Telecoms 
Industry for the economic analysis of the dynamics of industrial change. 
 The Technological and Learning Regimes  
A key part (though not the only part – see below) of the ‘engine’ driving 
change in the Telecoms Industry is the technological regime that exists in 
this industry (4). The technological regime is defined by the conditions under 
which technological knowledge is created - which determine the rate of 
 
(1) For example, an important recent survey of economics literature on industrial dynamics by 
DOSI, MALERBA & ORSENIGO (1997) concludes that "Certainly the gap between the richness 
of the histories [of the evolution of specific industries] and of their 'appreciative' interpretations 
on the one hand and the theoretical models that are used to ‘explain’ them on the other still 
appears quite large." (p. 20).  
(2) "The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from 
the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, 
the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates." SCHUMPETER 
(1943), p. 83 (emphasis added).  As will be seen, it is proposed in this chapter that there are 
several engines driving the evolutionary process in addition to those proposed by Schumpeter. 
(3) Such studies, of course, cannot be dismissed as inductive and descriptive for the simple 
reason that it is not possible to induce or describe the causes of industrial change. These 
causes do not emerge automatically or unambiguously from the information that we have on the 
complex process of industrial change. Rather it is necessary to use, and constantly test, 
frameworks of interpretation in the attempt to come to grips with the tangle of causes that bring 
about industrial change. That alternative frameworks and conclusions are often possible, and 
accordingly have to be tested against the evidence, is part and parcel of the process of 
knowledge creation in this area. 
(4) The concept of technological regime used here is similar to that used in NELSON & 
WINTER (1974, 1978 and 1982) and in WINTER (1984), although it is broader. For example, 
WINTER (1984) distinguishes between two kinds of technological regimes: an entrepreneurial 
and a routinised technological regime. "An entrepreneurial regime is one that is favorable to 
innovative entry and unfavorable to innovative activity by established firms; a routinized regime 
is one in which the conditions are the other way round" (p. 297). AUDRETSCH (1997) uses the 
concept in the same way and Nelson & Winter. MALERBA & ORSENIGO (1990 and 1993) and 
DOSI, MALERBA, MARSILI & ORSENIGO (1997) provide a further elaboration of the concept 
of technological regime. More specifically, in the latter reference it is stated that "a technological 
regime is a particular combination of some fundamental properties of technologies: opportunity 
and appropriability conditions; degrees of cumulativeness of technological knowledge; and 
characteristics of the relevant knowledge base" (p. 94). 
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technical change and the kinds of technologies that are created - and the 
opportunities and constraints that exist in the use of that knowledge.  The 
technological regime, in turn, defines the learning regime that determines the 
kinds of learning paths and patterns in which the firms and other 
organisations involved in the industry will engage. 
In order to understand the evolution of the Telecoms Industry - from the 
Old Telecoms Industry that existed until the mid-1980s, through the New 
Telecoms Industry, to the Info-communications Industry – it is necessary to 
analyse the changing technological and learning regimes. 
 The Old Telecoms Industry to the Mid-1980s  
Mapping the Old Telecoms Industry 
A simplified map of the Old Telecoms Industry is provided in Exhibit1 in 
the form of a layer model (5).  
Exhibit 1.  Layers Of The Old Telecoms Industry 
Layer 3: Services layer 
( voice, fax, 0800 services) 
Layer 2: Network layer 
(circuit-switched network) 
Layer 1: Equipement layer 
(switches, transmission systems, customer premises equipment) 
The layers of the Old Telecoms Network 
Layer 1 of the Old Telecoms Industry is the equipment layer where the 
network elements – such as switches and transmission systems - and 
customer premises equipment are produced that are combined to form and 
use telecoms networks.  Until the 1970s these networks, shown in Exhibit 1 
in Layer 2, were primarily circuit-switched networks where a dedicated circuit 
connects the sender and the recipient of information. In the 1970s the first 
 
 
(5) Further details on the layer structure of the Old Telecoms Industry are to be found in 
FENEYROL (1998). 
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commercial packet-switched data networks made their appearance although 
it was only in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s when the Internet 
became widely adopted, that data communications that data services 
became financially important.  As shown in Layer 3, the main services in the 
latter stages of the Old Telecoms Industry were voice, fax, and enhanced 
services such as toll-free 0800 services. Later in this chapter we shall return 
to the layer model in order to examine the impact of the Internet on what will 
be referred to as the Info-communications Industry. 
Monopoly, vertical integration and quasi-vertical integration 
In the days of the Old Telecoms Industry the conventional wisdom was 
that telecoms were an example of 'natural monopoly', that is due to 
increasing returns to scale telecoms services could only be provided 
efficiently by a monopoly provider. Accordingly, in most industrialised 
countries (Finland being a notable exception) Layer 2, the network layer, 
was dominated by a monopoly network operator. 
The natural monopoly hypothesis, however, was not, by and large, 
extended to Layer 1, the equipment layer. In different countries the 
production of telecoms equipment was organised in different ways.  At the 
one extreme was the US where a pattern of vertical integration emerged 
almost from the birth of the Telecoms Industry.  
In the US "from the time that Alexander Graham Bell co-operated with instrument-
maker Thomas Watson in producing the first telephone sets, it was the same 
organisation that both developed the telecommunications network and developed 
and manufactured the equipment that it required.  This pattern was firmly established 
in 1880, when the American Bell Telephone Company purchased Western Union’s 
telephone supplying subsidiary, the Western Electric Company of Chicago.  
According to an 1882 agreement, American Bell restricted itself to purchasing all its 
telephone equipment from Western Electric, while the latter agreed to limit its 
activities to supplying American Bell and its licensees" (FRANSMAN, 1995, p. 24).  
This vertical integration of network operation and equipment production in 
AT&T continued until the company’s voluntary trivestiture in September 1995 
into one company providing telecoms services - the new AT&T - one 
providing equipment, Lucent, and one providing computers and computer 
services, essentially the former NCR that had been acquired in a hostile 
take-over by AT&T in 1993. 
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At the other extreme were the smaller industrialised countries (Sweden 
with Ericsson being a notable exception) and most of the developing 
countries where the national monopoly telecoms carriers procured their 
telecoms equipment from the handful of specialist telecoms equipment 
suppliers who competed in world markets for telecoms equipment. While 
being profitably locked into long-term relationships with the monopoly 
network operators in their home country, these specialist technology 
suppliers competed vigorously in the rest of the world where telecoms 
equipment markets were not similarly locked up by competing suppliers with 
privileged supply relationships with the national operator. 
In the middle were the large industrialised countries with domestic 
markets that were sufficiently large to support domestic telecoms equipment 
production. In this category of countries, however, the economic 
organisation of Layers 1 and 2 – the equipment and network layers – 
differed significantly.   
In Japan, for example, from the late Nineteenth Century, when the 
Ministry of Communications took responsibility for the development of the 
new telecoms infrastructure, the decision was made for several competing 
companies to produce the telecoms equipment required for the Japanese 
telecoms network.  In this way a family of four specialist telecoms equipment 
suppliers emerged to supply the Ministry under a form of economic 
organisation that has been referred to as 'controlled competition' (6). The 
lead company was NEC, founded in 1899 as a majority-owned subsidiary of 
Western Electric, the equipment supplying subsidiary of AT&T. The other 
three members of the family were Fujitsu – which had an ownership link with 
Siemens – Hitachi, the only independent Japanese telecoms equipment 
supplier, and Oki.  This family of suppliers continued to supply NTT, the 
national monopoly operator, which was separated from the Ministry in 1952 
as an independent state-owned company. 
In Britain the Post Office which had responsibility for telecoms (later 
separated as BT) also co-operated closely with national telecoms suppliers 
that included GEC, Plessey, and STC (a subsidiary of the US firm ITT).  
However, the British experience with a long-term obligational co-operative 
relationship between network operator and equipment supplier was not 
nearly as happy as in the Japanese case. By the time BT was privatised in 
1984 and liberalisation began in the British telecoms market the relationship 
 
(6) For a detailed account of the origins of the Japanese system of 'controlled competition' in 
telecoms, see FRANSMAN (1995), pp. 27-41. 
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between BT and its privileged national suppliers had already started to 
crumble (7).  
In France and Germany the monopoly network operator – to become 
France Telecom and Deutsche Telecom respectively – also co-operated 
closely with national equipment suppliers. In France a complex process of 
government-inspired re-organisations and mergers, largely between the 
subsidiaries of the American company ITT and French electronics 
companies, resulted in the birth of the major French specialist telecoms 
equipment company, Alcatel (8). In Germany it was the electrical and 
electronics company, Siemens, that immediately became the major national 
equipment supplier although the German government also procured 
equipment from non-German suppliers. 
To conclude, in Japan, Britain, France and Germany a pattern of close, 
long-term, obligational co-operation emerged as the dominant form of 
economic organisation between the monopoly operator in Layer 2 and the 
specialist technology suppliers in Layer 1. Although the degree of 
competition between the national suppliers in their national market differed – 
with Japan insisting on the strongest degree of competition – it is reasonable 
to characterise the dominant form of economic organisation in these 
countries as one of quasi-vertical integration.  
The technological regime in the Old Telecoms Industry 
Earlier we stated that the technological regime is defined by the 
conditions under which technological knowledge is created and the 
opportunities and constraints that exist in the use of that knowledge.  What 
were the conditions under which technological knowledge was created in the 
Old Telecoms Industry? To answer this question it is necessary to 
understand the innovation system that existed in the Old Telecoms Industry.   
Essentially, in the Old Telecoms Industry the ‘engine of innovation’ was 
located in the central research laboratories of the monopoly telecoms 
operators such as AT&T’s Bell Laboratories, BT’s Martlesham Laboratories, 
France Telecoms’s CNET Laboratories, or NTT’s Electrical Engineering 
Laboratories.  It was in these laboratories that the research was done that 
 
(7) For a detailed account of the less-than-happy British attempt at co-operative research and 
development in the case of telecoms switches, involving the monopoly operator and its family of 
suppliers, see FRANSMAN (1995), pp. 89-97. 
(8) For a detailed account of the birth of Alcatel, see FRANSMAN (1995), pp. 87-89. 
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would lead eventually to the next generations of switches, transmissions 
systems and other telecoms equipment that would improve telecoms 
services.  Many of the key technologies still driving the Infocommunications 
Industry began life in these central research laboratories - such as the 
transistor, the laser, the design of cellular mobile systems, and the software 
language C that all emanated from Bell Laboratories. 
Typically, after the central research laboratory did the initial research and 
developed and tested the initial prototypes the task of further development 
and mass manufacture was handed on to the specialist equipment suppliers 
– such as Western Electric in AT&T’s case or NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi and Oki 
for NTT. Over time, however, these specialist equipment suppliers increased 
their own R&D capabilities with the result that they eventually took over 
many of the innovative tasks that in the Old Telecoms Industry were 
performed by the central research laboratories of the monopoly telecoms 
operators. As we shall see, this created a fundamental change in the 
technological and learning regimes that was to profoundly change the entire 
structure of the Telecoms Industry. 
How efficient was the innovation system of the Old Telecoms Industry?  
In answering this question it has to be said that despite the national 
monopoly position enjoyed by the telecoms operator and the small number 
of privileged specialist suppliers who created the equipment for the telecoms 
network the innovation system system worked remarkably well.  Evidence 
for this conclusion comes from the impressive stream of both radical and 
incremental innovations that emerged from the central research laboratories 
of the monopoly operators. One performance benchmark comes from the 
fact that in the US the price of a local phone call remained constant in 
money terms for about one hundred years.   
The paradox of a rapid rate of radical and incremental innovation from a 
system dominated by a monopolist supplied by no more than four privileged 
suppliers is to be explained in terms of the non-market incentives for 
innovation that nevertheless existed in the Old Telecoms Industry. The first 
of these non-market incentives came in the form of the ‘co-operative 
competition’ that existed between national systems to be the first to 
introduce the next generation of technologies and services.  One example is 
the races that took place to develop the next generation of telecoms 
switches, races that were nonetheless punctuated by the formal and informal 
sharing of information through institutions such as regular international 
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switching conferences that brought together the world’s best (9). The second 
major non-market incentive came in the form of political incentives and 
pressures to improve telecoms services for both residential and business 
users who together constituted the bulk of the population. 
However, despite the impressive innovative performance of the Old 
Telecoms Industry,  there were several characteristics of the innovation 
system in this industry that constituted important constraints on the 
innovation process, constraints that were to be highlighted by a comparative 
analysis of the new innovation process in the New Telecoms Industry that 
replaced it (which is examined in more detail below).   
The characteristics of the innovation system in the Old Telecoms Industry 
are summarised in Exhibit 2. 
Exhibit 2:  Characteristics of the Innovation System in the Old Telecoms Industry 
Closed innovation system 
High entry barriers 
Few innovators 
Fragmented knowledge base 
Medium-powered incentives 
Slow, sequential, innovation process: 
Research – prototype – 
trials - cutover 
To begin with, the innovation system in the Old Telecoms Industry was 
closed in the sense that only the monopoly telecoms operator and its chosen 
circle of specialist equipment suppliers were given access to the telecoms 
network and were able to make innovations for it. This implied that there 
were extremely high, even prohibitive, barriers to entry into this innovation 
system. Accordingly, there were very few innovators. Furthermore, the 
knowledge base underpinning global telecoms was fragmented. Each 
national telecoms network had its own specific designs and technologies.  
For example, central office switches designed for the Japanese market could 
not, without the cost of considerable modification, be immediately deployed 
in Europe or the US. The same was true for switches designed for the 
European or US markets.  Under this regime incentives were medium-
powered since the market size for products designed for specific markets 
was relatively small.   
 
(9) For a detailed study of the development of telecoms switches in the US, Japan, and Europe 
and for the development of optical fibre in the US, Japan and the UK, see FRANSMAN (1995). 
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Finally, the innovation process itself was slow and sequential. In the 
circuit-switched network it was necessary that switching and transmission 
equipment worked with extremely high degrees of reliability. Equipment 
failure could lead to entire networks being shut down. Typically, the 
innovation process began with research being done in the central research 
laboratories of the leading monopoly operators. This research eventually 
resulted, in the second stage, in a prototype being developed.  In the third 
stage the prototype was exhaustively tested, first in the laboratory and then, 
after its further development and manufacture by the specialist equipment 
supplier/s, in field trials.  Finally, after the reliability of the prototype had been 
adequately demonstrated, the equipment was ‘cutover’ into the network.  
Although this innovation process 'worked' in the Old Telecoms Industry, its 
drawbacks became apparent, as we shall see below, in the light of the 
fundamentally different process that replaced it in the New Telecoms 
Industry. 
The learning regime in the Old Telecoms Industry 
The technological regime structured the learning regime.  Essentially, the 
learning process involved the monopoly network operator (located in  
Layer 2) learning how to run and improve its telecoms network which 
provided the platform for the services that it provided. Being a monopolist, 
the ‘selection environment’ of the network operator excluded pressures and 
incentives to compete in telecoms services markets. However, as noted in 
the previous section, there were pressures and incentives to improve both 
the network and services emanating from domestic political processes as 
well as rivalry between national systems to rapidly introduce new 
technologies and services. The latter pressures and incentives shaped the 
learning process. 
In the Old Telecoms Industry the monopoly network operator was both a 
user and an innovator of telecoms technologies and equipment. However, 
there was a division of labour with the network operator concentrating on 
research (including fundamental and long term research) and design while 
its selected equipment supplier/s (located in Layer 1) specialised in 
development and mass manufacture of equipment.  As a sophisticated user 
and innovator of telecoms technologies and equipment the monopoly 
network operator was well-placed to learn-by-using and by experiencing 
opportunities for further improvements by running the network. However, in 
developing telecoms technologies and equipment for mass manufacture the 
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specialist equipment suppliers were also undergoing a learning process that 
enabled them over time to move into the upstream parts of the innovation 
process, namely into increasingly research- and design-intensive activities.  
Moreover, while they may have enjoyed sheltered access to the 
procurement book of the monopoly network operator in their own domestic 
market, in order grow they were forced to enter and compete in foreign 
markets, particularly third-country markets where there were not similarly 
sheltered equipment suppliers producing for the domestic monopoly network 
operator.  Competitive pressures and incentives in these markets were an 
important stimulus for learning by the specialist equipment suppliers. 
The learning process was also structured by technological paradigms 
and trajectories. For example, the transition to each new generation of 
central office switch – from electro-mechanical to space-division electronic to 
digital time-division to asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches – was 
accompanied by considerable controversy over the question of whether 
improvements in the old paradigm would make the new paradigm  
irrelevant (10). Overall, however, it was the circuit-switched paradigm that 
shaped thinking and learning about how to achieve improvements. The 
deeply-ingrained influence of the circuit-switched paradigm on the part of 
telecoms researchers and engineers is apparent in the reception that Vinton 
Cerf and his colleagues (who were amongst the original founders of the 
Internet) encountered from Bell Labs researchers when details about the 
packet-switching that they were developing became known.  In Cerf’s words: 
"The packet-switching network was so counter-culture that a lot of people thought it 
was really stupid.  The AT&T guys thought we were all beside ourselves; they didn’t 
think that interactive computing was a move forward at all" (11).  
Coming from a computer culture, the developers of the ARPANET, the 
forerunner of the Internet, were not inclined, as were their telecoms 
counterparts, to see the problem of communications through the 
paradigmatic prism of circuit-switching. 
 
(10) See FRANSMAN (1995), Chapter 3, for further details. 
(11) Internet, 'Is there a future for the Net?  David Pitchford finds out from the man who invented 
it, Vinton Cerf', June 19th, 1996, p. 75. 
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 The Transition Telecoms Industry 
In the mid-1980s, for different political-economic reasons, Japan, the US 
and UK decided to end the monopolies of their monopoly network operators.  
The result was the birth of the original new entrants. 
The birth of the original new entrants 
The introduction of liberalisation and competition in these three countries, 
however, was at first cautious and tentative. In Japan three long-distance 
competitors were given regulatory permission to compete with NTT, namely 
DDI, Japan Telecom, and Teleway Japan.  NTT was only partially-privatised, 
with the Japanese Government continuing to own approximately two-thirds 
of the company. The UK government, on the other hand, soon sold off the 
majority of BT’s shares but began the process of liberalisation with a period 
of duopoly with Mercury, a subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, as the sole 
competitor to BT. In the US, AT&T was divested with the new AT&T 
inheriting the former company’s long-lines business (i.e. long-distance) while 
seven regional companies – the Baby Bells – retained the de facto monopoly 
of local telecoms services in their regions. MCI and Sprint were the two long-
distance companies allowed to compete with AT&T. 
Original new entrants and specialist technology suppliers 
Although liberalising regulatory regimes provided a necessary condition 
for rapid and successful entry by the original new entrants they were not 
sufficient.  Equally important were low technological barriers to entry into the 
telecoms services markets (in Layer 2) created by the existence of specialist 
telecoms equipment suppliers. These specialist technology suppliers 
provided the 'black-boxed' technologies that the Original New Entrants 
needed to contruct and run their own networks.  Unlike their counterparts in 
other industries such as pharmaceuticals or semiconductors, where 
substantial in-house technological capabilities were necessary in order to 
enter and compete, the Original New Entrants in the Telecoms Industry were 
able to turn to specialist technology suppliers for most of their technology 
requirements.  Without the knowledge-acquisition and learning processes 
that the specialist technology suppliers underwent in the Old Telecoms 
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Industry would-be original new entrants would have faced formidable 
technological barriers to entry. 
From the point of view of the specialist technology suppliers, liberalisation 
created new markets for their accumulating knowledge and competencies.  
An important example is Nortel that seized the new opportunities presented 
by liberalisation with both hands. Nortel was originally established in 1895 as 
the subsidiary of Bell Canada. From 1906 to 1962 AT&T’s equipment 
subsidiary, Western Electric, held a minority stake in Nortel, a stake that was 
gradually sold to Bell Canada. In 1971 Bell Canada, that bought most of its 
equipment from Nortel, established a joint R&D subsidiary with Nortel called 
BNR.  However, in order to grow, Nortel from the late 1970s made strenuous 
efforts to enter export markets. In these attempts the company was 
considerably aided by its pioneering success in developing one of the first 
small digital central office switches, the DMS 10.  Beating AT&T into this 
segment of the switching market Nortel was able to gain a foothold in the 
US, its first major breakthrough outside Canada (12).  
In MCI, the main long-distance competitor to AT&T, Nortel found an 
important ally. As a competitor to AT&T, MCI, like many of its original new 
entrant counterparts in other parts of the world (13), did not want to depend 
on the same specialist equipment suppliers that supplied the incumbent. 
This provided Nortel with the opening it was seeking. Furthermore, able to 
rely on Nortel and other specialist technology suppliers for the technology 
and equipment it needed, MCI also decided that it did not need to replicate 
similar R&D capabilities that AT&T had in its Bell Laboratories (14). With 
further stages of liberalisation in the US and Europe Nortel quickly became 
the main technology supplier to the 'new new entrants' as will be shown 
below. 
 
(12) Further details of Nortel success are to be found in FRANSMAN (1995), pp. 55-61, 
including an explanation of why Nortel managed to beat AT&T in this switch market segment. 
(13) DDI, the main competitor to NTT, similarly refused to procure its equipment from NTT’s 
family of specialist equipment suppliers, NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Oki. 
(14) Indeed, MCI took particular pride in the fact that, with access to specialist technology 
suppliers it did not need to make the same expenditures on R&D as AT&T. Indeed, while AT&T 
was spending more than seven percent of its sales on R&D MCI’s expenditures were so 
negligible that they were not even reported.  (Author’s interviews with Serge Wernikoff, Senior 
Vice President and Board Member of MCI, 1993 and 1994.) 
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The conservatism of the original new entrants 
Perhaps because the selection environment into which they were born 
was characterised by only partial competition, the original new entrants in 
the US and UK were conservative rather than radical in their competition 
with their incumbent, tending largely to imitate them while only slightly 
underpricing them. Soon, however, the orginal new entrants would be 
overshadowed by the new breed of ‘new new entrants’ whose entry signaled 
the emergence of the New Telecoms Industry. 
 The New Telecoms Industry from the Early-1990s  
Enter the new new entrants 
In retrospect, from the vantage point of the late-1990s, it was clear that a 
qualitative change had occurred in the Telecoms Industry in the early-1990s, 
signifying the birth of the New Telecoms Industry. The most evident sign of 
qualitative change was the rise of the new new entrants that quickly eclipsed 
the original new entrants and went on to pose the most significant threat to 
the incumbents.   
Most dramatic was the rise of WorldCom, a company that was born in 
1984 in the inauspicious location of Hattiesburg, Mississippi and began life 
as a reseller of the newly-divested AT&T’s capacity before making the key 
strategic decision to become a facilities-based operator. By the end of the 
millenium not only had WorldCom capped a string of mergers and 
acquisitions with the takeover of MCI and Sprint, the two main long-distance 
competitors to AT&T, it also boasted the world’s best global telecoms 
network making this company the most serious threat to the Big Five 
Incumbents – AT&T, BT, Deutsche Telecom, France Telecom, and NTT.  
Although they emerged later than WorldCom and were not at large in terms 
of revenue and market capitalisation, several other new new entrants 
replicated essentially the same growth process.  These companies included 
Qwest, Level 3, Global Crossing, Williams, and Viatel.   
In Europe new new entrants made a similar, though somewhat later, 
dramatic entry.  These new players in Europe included telecoms operators 
such as COLT (City of London Telecommunications), Energis (the English 
telecoms subsidiary of the regional electricity supplier), and Mannesmann 
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(the German industrial engineering company that transformed itself into both 
a fixed-line and mobile operator). 
Unlike the original new entrants, the new new entrants were far more 
aggressive in their competition. This was seen both in their activities in the 
market for corporate control as well as in global telecoms markets. In the 
late 1990s, for example, WorldCom acquired MCI and Sprint (as already 
noted), Qwest acquired US West (the smallest Baby Bell), and Global 
Crossing acquired Frontier. Furthermore, all the US new new entrants began 
to construct their own global networks even before their US networks were 
fully completed, typically beginning in the UK, the most liberalised of the 
European markets, and then moving on to construct pan-European 
networks. (This raises an important puzzle about the characteristics of the 
US telecoms system that explain why the most aggressive telecoms 
operators, in terms of the global expansion, are American) (15).  It was only 
in Japan that by the end of the millenium new new entrants had not 
displaced the original new entrants (16).  
Why were the new new entrants able to make such a dramatic entry and 
why were they able to be so successful so rapidly?  A large part of the 
answer to this important question lies in the changes that occurred in the 
technological regime, changes that began already in the late stages of the 
Old Telecoms Industry. 
The technological regime in the new Telecoms Industry 
By the mid-1990s a decisive process of vertical specialisation had 
occurred between Layers 1 and 2 (see Exhibit 1 above) in the Telecoms 
Industry.  As noted earlier, in the Old Telecoms Industry the R&D engine 
was largely located in the central research laboratories of the monopoly 
network operators such as AT&T, BT, and NTT, with the specialist 
equipment suppliers being largely relegated to playing the role of dependent 
developers and manufacturers.  By the end of 1995, however, this situation 
had changed dramatically with the now incumbent network operators making 
the decision to leave more and more of the R&D related to the network and 
its elements to the specialist equipment suppliers. At the same time the 
 
(15) As will be made clear later, this generalisation, while true for the fixed-line operators is 
untrue for the mobile operators. It the mobile field, for reasons that will be analysed below, it 
was European and to a lesser extent Japanese companies that dominated globally. 
(16) This is a further puzzle that also requires explanation in terms of the characteristics of the 
Japanese telecoms system. Unfortunately, however, there is insufficient space here to explore 
this puzzle.   
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incumbents decided to open their procurement, agreeing to buy from new 
suppliers in addition to their traditional suppliers. 
A snapshot of the technological regime in transition, as it moved from the 
Old to the New Telecoms Industry, is provided in an article published in 1994 
that compared AT&T, BT and NTT in terms of their visions, strategies, 
competencies, and R&D (17). This article amongst other things showed that 
these three companies had made fundamentally different organisational 
decisions regarding their technological competencies and their procurement 
of telecoms equipment. While AT&T resorted to vertical integration, 
procuring the bulk of its equipment from its own equipment business, BT, at 
the other extreme, had decided increasingly to resort to the market for its 
equipment needs.  In the middle, NTT relied on its own home-grown form of 
organisation, namely controlled competition involving a closed family of four 
suppliers, for its equipment supplies. The different choices made by these 
three companies were reflected in their markedly different R&D-intensities.  
While AT&T spent about 7 percent of its sales on R&D, the figure was 
around 4.5 percent for NTT and about 1.9 percent for BT. 
By the end of 1995, however, a decisive process of convergence began 
to take place between these three companies.  AT&T underwent the biggest 
change when, in September 1995, the company voluntarily trivested itself, 
spinning off its equipment business in the form of Lucent, and NCR, the 
computer company that it had acquired in a hostile takeover in 1993. BT 
continued along the path that it had chartered from the early 1990s, after its 
unhappy experiences in jointly developing its own System X digital switch, 
and left more and more of its network needs to the market.  NTT, to begin 
with to some extent under trade-related pressure from the US but later 
increasingly responding to the new opportunities provided by vertical 
specialisation, began to procure a greater proportion of its equipment from 
outside its traditional family of suppliers and to shift its R&D away from 
network-related areas and more towards service-related innovation.   
The changing location of R&D in the New Telecoms Industry 
One of the best indicators of change in technological regime as the Old 
Telecoms Industry gave way to the New Telecoms Industry is provided by 
data on the changing location of R&D.  This data is summarised in Exhibit 3. 
 
(17) See FRANSMAN (1994), reprinted in FRANSMAN (1999). 
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Several characteristics of the technological regime in the New Telecoms 
Industry are evident from Exhibit 3. The first characteristic is that the 
incumbent network operators – represented in Exhibit 3 by NTT, BT and 
AT&T – are not particularly R&D-intensive.  Indeed, the bottom left hand cell 
in Exhibit 3 shows that the incumbents are less R&D-intensive than the 
average in industries that are not normally thought of as 'high-tech' 
industries, namely the vehicle, lesure and hotel, building materials, and 
brewery industries. 
Exhibit 3:  The Location of R&D in the New Telecoms Industry, 1999 
FIRM/INDUSTRY R&D % SALES 
NTT 3.7% 
BT 1.9% 
AT&T 1.6% 
Cisco 18.7% 
Ericsson 14.5% 
Nortel 13.9% 
Lucent 11.5% 
Nokia 10.4% 
WorldCom ~ 0% 
Qwest ~ 0% 
Level 3 ~ 0% 
Global Crossing ~ 0% 
Roche 15.5% 
Glaxo Welcome 14.4% 
Smithkline Beecham 10.8% 
Vehicle Industry 4.2% 
Leisure & Hotel Industry 3.2% 
Building Materials Industry 3.0% 
Brewery Industry 2.3% 
Source:  Financial Times, R&D Scoreboard, 1999, 
and author’s calculations from company reports. 
The second characteristic is that the new new entrants – represented 
here by WorldCom, Qwest, Level 3, and Global Crossing – are even less 
R&D-intensive than the incumbents, doing virtually no in-house R&D.  The 
reason, as already mentioned in this chapter, is that the new new entrants 
have made the strategic decision to outsource almost all of their R&D 
requirements to the specialist technology suppliers. The reasoning given by 
Energis, one of the major new new entrant rivals to BT in the UK, for not 
doing its own R&D is typical for all the new new entrants: 
"Energis’ policy is not to undertake significant research and development, but to 
utilise technology developed by its suppliers and, as a result, Energis has spent an 
immaterial amount on research and development…" (18). 
 
(18) Energis, Global Offering, Form 20-F, p. 6. 
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As a substitute for its own internal R&D Energis has forged a highly 
satisfactory relationship with Nortel as its main technology supplier, a 
relationship that has also involved the subcontracting of specific R&D 
projects (19). Similarly, Qwest, the US new new entrant that in 1999 acquired 
the smallest of the Baby Bells, US West, also undertakes virtually no internal 
R&D.  In its 1998 Annual Report Qwest states that its "R&D costs incurred in 
the normal course of business are… $27.7 million… in 1998". This compares 
with the company’s total revenue for 1998 of $2,242.7 million, which makes 
Qwest’s R&D expenditure a mere 0.012 percent of total revenue (20). As 
Qwest freely admits: 
"We built our network with state-of-the-art technology and through alliances with 
companies like Cisco, Nortel and Ascend.  In 1998 we continued to join with the best 
in the business to take the power of network applications to more markets in new 
ways with advanced products" (21). 
The third characteristic is that R&D-intensive activities, mainly relating to 
the elements that go into networks, have moved decisively into the specialist 
technology suppliers, represented in Exhibit 3 by Cisco, Ericsson, Nortel, 
Lucent and Nokia. These specialist technology suppliers are some six times 
as R&D-intensive as the incumbents, AT&T, BT and NTT. Furthermore, their 
R&D-intensity is comparable to that of the pharmaceutical companies, 
acknowledged to be amongst the most R&D-intensive of all sectors. This is 
evident from the figures provided in Exhibit 3 for the pharmaceutical 
companies Roche, Glaxo Welcome, and Smithkline Beecham.  And the five 
specialist technology suppliers represented in Exhibit 3 represent just the tip 
of the iceberg. In addition to the other large telecoms equipment suppliers 
such as Alcatel, Siemens, NEC, and Fujitsu are the huge number of R&D-
intensive medium sized companies that are supplying significant telecoms 
technologies in numerous niches. 
It may be concluded, therefore, that while in the Old Telecoms Industry 
the 'innovative engine' was located largely in the central research 
laboratories of the monopoly network operators in the New Telecoms 
Industry the 'R&D engine' has moved decisively into the specialist 
technology suppliers. This provides one key indicator of the extent of the 
process of vertical specialisation between Layers 1 and 2 (see Exhibit 1) in 
the New Telecoms Industry. 
 
(19) Author’s interview with Mike Grabiner, CEO of Energis, 1999. 
(20) Qwest, Annual Report, p. 33 and 28 respectively. 
(21) Qwest, Annual Report 1998, p. 11. 
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A significant word of caution, however, is necessary regarding this 
conclusion. This arises because it is important not to confuse R&D with 
innovation. Firms with low R&D-intensity may nevertheless be highly 
innovative, and their innovativeness may lead to competitiveness and high 
profitability. One example is MCI’s Family and Friends billing innovation that 
allowed the company to offer preferential tariffs on several frequently called 
numbers and gave the company for a while a significant advantage over its 
rival, AT&T. Although not falling under the conventional classification of 
R&D, this innovation is indicative of the kinds of advances that may be made 
that do not involve R&D. We shall return later to the importance of innovation 
in discussion of the learning regime in the New Telecoms Industry. 
Specialist technology suppliers and low technological barriers to entry 
One part of the answer to the puzzle of why the new new entrants were 
able to enter the Telecoms Industry so rapidly and so successfully is now, in 
the light of the analysis of the changing technological regime, apparent.  
Being able to rely on highly competitive markets for technology supplied by a 
host of rivalrous specialist technology suppliers, the new new entrant 
operators have faced extremely low technological barriers to entry.   
This also explains the apparent paradox of firms that to begin with know 
virtually nothing about telecommunications becoming telecoms operators.  
Examples include Bernard Ebbers who was one of the founders of 
WorldCom but had a background as a football coach and motel operator; 
COLT (City of London Telecommunications), one of the main challengers to 
BT in the UK, which was established by Fidelity, the largest mutual fund in 
the US (that earlier had established Teleport, a competitive local exchange 
carrier in New York and Boston that was later sold to AT&T); Qwest, 
established by Philip Anschutz, a billionaire with a background in ranching, 
oil, and railroads; and Mannesmann, Olivetti, and Energis that came from 
backgrounds in industrial engineering, electronics, and electricity 
respectively. 
With such low technological barriers to entry, the result has been a highly 
competitive market for network services (in Layer 2, see Exhibit 1) (22).   
However, the contribution of specialist technology suppliers was not 
confined to the supply of technology. Also important are the human 
 
(22) A further important contributor to competition in Layer 2 has been the proliferation of 
competing network technologies, a topic that is take up later in the section dealing with different 
forms of competition in the New Telecoms Industry. 
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resources that these suppliers have provided, through the operations of the 
labour market, to both the original new entrants and the new new entrants.  
An examination of the backgrounds of the leading executives in the major 
original new entrant and new new entrant telecoms companies readily 
reveals the importance of recruitment from specialist technology suppliers 
(as well as from the incumbents). Furthermore, there are key examples 
where specialist technology suppliers, like Nortel and Ericsson, have also 
provided their new new entrant customers with finance that in some cases 
has played a major role in facilitating the growth of these companies. 
Also central has been the role played by capital markets. In some cases 
capital markets have interacted with labour markets to support the entry and 
growth of new entrants, for example where share option schemes, with the 
expectation of significant future increases in share values, have provided an 
important incentive for people possessing key knowledge to move from 
specialist technology suppliers, or incumbents, to new entrants. The role of 
capital markets is analysed in more detail in a separate section below. 
The learning regime in the New Telecoms Industry 
Is noted earlier, the technological regime structures the learning regime.  
What are the main learning processes that occur in the New Telecoms Industry? 
Learning by network operators (23) 
Exhibit 3 above suggests that it is necessary, in examining the learning 
process in the New Telecoms Industry, to distinguish between the R&D-
performing incumbent network operators – such as AT&T, BT, Deutsche 
Telecom, France Telecom, and NTT – and the R&D-less new new entrants 
such as WorldCom, Qwest, COLT, and Engergis.  In the former companies 
the learning process includes activities undertaken in organisationally-
distinct R&D laboratories, whether they are attached to business units 
(where the bulk of the incumbents’ R&D resources are located) or situation 
in central research facilities. In the latter companies, as we have seen, R&D 
 
(23) Attention in this section is confined to those telecoms companies that own and operate 
their own networks, that is to the larger companies in Layer 2 (see Exhibit 1). In a very different 
position are facilities-less telecoms service providers – such as call-back providers, resellers, or 
facilities-less Internet Service Providers.  Since these kinds of telecoms companies buy-in the 
services of network operators their learning processes are fundamentally different from those of 
facilities-based telecoms companies. We shall return to facilities-less telecoms service providers 
in our discussion below of the layer model for the Infocommunications Industry. 
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learning is entirely outsourced to specialist technology suppliers and the 
fruits of this learning bought-in in the form of tangible assets such as 
telecoms equipment or intangible knowledge such as occurs when 
technological advice is given. 
However, all network operators participate in the division of labour that 
follows from the process of vertical specialisation between Layers 1 and 2 
(see Exhibit 1).  In particular, all network operators are heavily dependent on 
purchases from specialist technology suppliers of technology in the form of 
network-related equipment and associated systems such as billing and IT 
management software. This dependence is even greater in the case of the 
new new entrants who, as we have seen, do not undertake their own R&D. 
Nevertheless, since all of the network operators are very dependent on 
specialist technology suppliers, much of their learning takes the form of 
learning to use, rather than learning to produce, technology. 
New new operators as F4 firms 
A further distinguishing feature of the new operators, in contrast to the 
incumbents, is their ability to focus on a subset of market segments. This 
ability has resulted largely from the absence of universal service obligations 
(even though regulatory regimes sometimes require new operators to 
contribute financially to universal service). This has meant that new 
operators have been able to choose particular market segments – such as 
multinational business, large domestic business, small and medium-sized 
business, or residential customers – and focus their learning processes on 
the chosen segments.  In turn, their focus on particular customer segments 
and their absence of universal service obligations has allowed the new 
operators to be smaller than their incumbent competitors. Smaller 
employment size, correspondingly, has allowed new operators to create 
three other organisational 'F-characteristics': flatness, fastness, and 
flexibility. Compared with the incumbents, the new operators have been able 
to avoid hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations in favour of flat 
organisations; they have been able to establish streamlined decision-making 
procedures facilitating fast decisions; and this has given them the ability to 
change direction or establish new directions more quickly than their 
incumbent competitors. Together with focus, in short, they have been able to 
become 'F4 Firms'. 
An example is provided by Energis, the telecoms subsidiary of the 
National Grid, the main electricity provider in England and Wales. Exhibit 4 
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shows the functional employment of Energis, that has become one of the main 
long-distance competitors to BT and more recently has moved into metropolitan 
area networks and has begun operations on the European continent. 
Exhibit 4.  Employment by Function in Energis 
Department/Function Number Percen t 
Customer Service 138 17.0% 
Executive 6 0.8% 
Finance, Property & Legal 123 15.0% 
Human Resources 11 1.4% 
Information Systems 84 11.0% 
Marketing 48 6.0% 
Network Operations & Engineering 256 32.0% 
Sales 129 16.0% 
Strategy and Business Development 3 0.4% 
Total 798 100,0% 
Source: HSBC, Global Offering of 60,000,000 Ordinary Shares. 
At A Price of £16.50 Each In Energis plc, January 22nd, 1999, p. 19. 
At this stage Energis, which started operations only in 1993, had sales of 
around £400 million, had built a network of 6,500 km covering all the 
principal business centres in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and had 
already joined the FTSE 100 (Financial Times stock exhange index) list of 
the most valuable companies (24).  
The differentiation dilemma 
Although the network operators have benefited greatly from the 
technology supplied by the specialist technology suppliers, they have also 
had to confront the downside of this transaction. By depending on the 
specialist technology suppliers, who supply their state-of-the-art technology 
to anyone with the ability to pay for it, the network operators have foregone a 
possible source of differentiation from their competitors, namely improved 
products, services and process brought about by internally produced 
technical change. This may be referred to as the differentiation dilemma.  In 
short, network operators are unable to enjoy the benefits of bette 
technologies than their rivals. All have access to essentially the same 
technologies (25).  
 
(24) Energis plc, Interim Report 1999/2000, p. 2. 
(25) Of course, different network operators may choose different technologies. For example, 
operators competing in the local access market have the choice of optical fibre, XDSL/copper 
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The differentiation dilemma is particularly acute for the new operators 
who, as we have seen, do virtually none of their own R&D (26). The R&D-
performing incumbents, on the other hand, have a potential advantage 
stemming from their in-house R&D capabilities. However, as we have also 
seen, the vast bulk of R&D in the New Telecoms Industry is done by the 
specialist technology suppliers and this accordingly limits the ability of the 
incumbents to achieve significant technological advantages from their in-
house R&D. Nevertheless, this issue raises the important question of 
whether, over time, the new entrants will find that they too should be doing 
their own internal R&D in order to keep up in the competitive race. 
The differentiation dilemma is a dilemma precisely because, in the 
absence of differentiation, and with substantial new entry facilitated by low 
entry barriers, firms are unable to earn scarcity rents.  Accordingly, profit 
margins will be low. This raises a key question: How do network operators 
compete in the New Telecoms Industry? What characteristics drive 
competitiveness? 
In some cases a partial solution to the differentiation dilemma is available 
to a few network operators. For example, Qwest, as a result of Philip 
Anschutz’s railway property rights, was able to acquire important rights-of-
way that allowed the company to secure its optical fibre conduits by burying 
them alongside railway lines. In turn, the scarcity of these property rights 
allowed Qwest to earn substantial economic rents.  More specifically, Qwest 
has been able to earn significant revenues by selling some of the capacity 
on its optical fibre networks to competitors Frontier, WorldCom, and GTE in 
the form of dark fibre (27) Indeed, Qwest has stated that "the sale of dark 
fiber [primarily to these three competitors] has financed more than two-thirds 
of our overall [network] construction costs" (28).  Similarly, cellular mobile 
and fixed wireless access companies have benefited from the natural 
scarcity of spectrum (to some extent paid for by the auction price of 
spectrum).  Some competitive local exchange carriers have also argued that 
                     
cable, coaxial cable, fixed wireless access, cellular mobile, and even satellite. However, other 
operators have access to exactly the same technologies. 
(26) In theory, new operators do have the option of outsourcing R&D to specialist technology 
suppliers.  In my interviews I have come across cases where the new operator has negotiated 
temporary privileged access to the output resulting from outsourced R&D.  After the temporary 
period has ended, however – usually a short period of around six months – the specialist 
technology supplier tends to assume full control over the technology.  In practice, however, 
there seem to be very few examples where this has given the new operator a significant 
technology-based competitive advantage. 
(27) That is, unused, or unlit, optical fibre. 
(28) Qwest, Annual Report 1998, p. 13. 
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permission to dig up the streets and lay cables, and the sheer difficulties 
involved in so doing, constitute important entry barriers and, faced with 
competitive service tariffs, make entry relatively unattractive for  
late-comers (29).  
However, even after these entry barriers are taken into account, the 
problem for an operator attempting to differentiate its products and services 
remains. So, how do network operators compete in the New Telecoms 
Industry? 
In competing with the incumbents the new new operators enjoy a 
particular competitive advantage (that has to be set against the 
disadvantages of the new entrant vis-à-vis the established incumbent). This 
advantage stems from the so-called legacy networks of the incumbent, that 
is the older-generation technologies that are, inevitably, incorporated in parts 
of the incumbent’s network. The new new operator, on the other hand, can 
start with a clean slate, deploying only the latest, state-of-the-art technology.  
Reading through the evaluations of the new new operators made by the 
leading stock market analysts it is clear that considerable weight has been 
placed on the technological advantage of the new entrant relative to the 
incumbent in calculating expected future market share and earnings (30).  
The problem facing the new new operator, however, is that while the latest 
technology may provide a competitive advantage against the incumbent, the 
window of opportunity thereby provided is inevitably short-lived: in due 
course, even newer entrants will be able to enjoy the benefits of even more 
recent technologies. 
Furthermore, in competing with other new new entrants that have entered 
at the same time an operator is unable to rely on technological superiority. In 
these cases competition revolves around the attempt to provide superior 
quality of service – such as quicker provisioning time and quicker restoration 
of disrupted service – and superior customer care, such as better 
understanding of customer needs and a greater ability to provide solutions, 
on the basis of the same common technology, to customer problems.  This 
competitive process is similar to other industries where service providers are 
 
(29) Authors interviews. 
(30) For example, in the valuations of Qwest considerable weight has been attached to the 
company’s competitive advantage that has followed from its more effective use than AT&T of 
technologies such as self-healing SONET (an optical protocol facilitating broadband capacity 
transmission) ring architectures, that allow traffic to be routed in two directions thus facilitating a 
continuity of service in the event of a break in the optical fibre cable; advanced optical fibre and 
transmissions technologies that allow for OC-192 level bandwidth which operates at 10 gigabits 
providing the highest speeds currently available; and a 2.4 gigabit (OC-48) Internet Protocol 
architecture that supports the most advanced data communications services.   
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supplied by common specialist technology suppliers, such as the airline 
business where airlines, supplied by the same providers of airframes, aero-
engines, and in-flight entertainment systems struggle to persuade customers 
that they are somehow different. 
This analysis of the differentiation dilemma, however, raises the puzzle of 
why stock markets have valued the shares of new new entrant operators so 
highly. In turn this poses the broader question of the role that financial 
markets have played in the New Telecoms Industry. 
The role of financial markets 
In this paper significant weight has been put on the technological and 
learning regimes as an 'engine' of evolution in the Telecoms Industry.  
However, it is not the only engine.  Another important engine of change has 
been financial markets. 
Financial markets have influenced the evolution of the Telecoms 
Industries in two major ways. First, they have facilitated the entry and initial 
growth of new entrants, in particular the new new entrants. Secondly, they 
have facilitated the 're-shuffling of the capital stock' (31) that has taken place 
as both network operators and specialist technology suppliers with highly 
valued shares have used their valuable ‘paper’ (shares) to acquire the 
complementary knowledge and tangible assets of other companies. By so 
doing, financial markets have facilitated the process of consolidation in the 
Telecoms Industry that, in turn, has enabled dynamic increasing returns, 
economies of scale, and economies of scope to be realised. 
Financial markets have facilitated the entry and initial growth of new 
entrants as investible resources have been made available to the owners of 
these companies, primarily through bond and equity markets. But financial 
markets have also aided entry and initial growth through the equity valuation 
process. Those new entrants that have been able to convince financial 
analysts and investors that they have relatively attractive future prospects 
have been rewarded with appreciating share values. In turn, appreciating 
values have enabled these new entrants to further tap bond and equity 
markets on reasonable terms. Furthermore, as already noted, by making 
employee incentive schemes such as stock options lucrative, financial 
markets have reinforced the operation of labour markets, enabling new 
entrants to attract necessary human resources.      
 
(31) This is a concept that comes from the Austrian economist, Luwig Lachmann. 
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Acquisitions have also been facilitated by the stock market valuation 
process (32). For example, WorldCom’s acquisition of MCI and Sprint, 
Vodafone’s acquisition of Airtouch and Mannesmann, Qwest’s acquisition of 
US West, and Global Crossing’s acquisition of Frontier were paid for largely 
with shares of the acquiring company. In this way these companies used 
their shares, highly valued by stock markets, as a ‘currency’ with which to 
finance their acquisitions.   
In Exhibit 6 the market capitalisation of the main US new new entrants is 
examined and compared to the incumbents and some of the major specialist 
technology suppliers. 
Exhibit 6: Market Capitalisation of Some New New Entrants  
and Other Selected Companies 
Name Rank MKT Value ($bn) Country 
Microsoft 1 407 US 
AT&T 7 186 US 
Cisco 9 174 US 
NTT 13 157 Japan 
MCI-Worldcom 14 152 US 
Lucent 16 150 US 
Deutsche Telecom 23 115 Germany 
BT 26 107 Britain 
NTT Docomo 27  106 Japan 
SBC Communications 31 100 US 
France Telecom 43 80 France 
Telecom Italia 58 67 Italy 
Nortel Networks 84 50 Canada 
Qwest 146 30 US 
Level 3 172 27 US 
Williams 204 22 US 
Global Crossing 244 20 US 
NTT Data 255 19 Japan 
Global Telesystems 716 6 US 
Source:  Business Week, July 12, 1999. 
 
 
(32) The high-yield bond market has also played an important role in providing the finance for 
expanding telecoms operating companies to extend their networks. One advantage of resorting 
to bonds rather than equity in funding expansion is that the dilution of ownership and control can 
be limited. The bonds, however, are high-yielding as a result of the high risk attached to loans to 
new entrant telecoms operators. 
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Exhibit 6 shows the remarkable market capitalisation of the US new new 
entrants, shown in bold, who were only established in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. These figures are for mid-1999 and at this time the new new 
entrants were together worth approximately the same as BT (33). 
It is clear, therefore, that the process of stock market valuation of 
companies has played a key role in the Telecoms Industry, justifying the 
inclusion of financial markets as one of the 'engines' driving the evolution of 
the industry. However, since stock market valuation has played such an 
important role it is necessary to inquire further into how these 'values' are 
determined (34).  
Inventing the value of telecoms company shares 
In principle, the value of a company’s shares is determined by the present 
discounted value of that company’s future earnings. Accordingly, the would-be 
valuer of a company’s shares must decide on what discount rate to use and 
on how to determine the company’s future earnings. Ignoring the discount 
rate, attention will focus here on future earnings and in particular on the future 
earnings of the new new entrant network operators (35).  
The problem that immediately arises in attempting to calculate the future 
earnings of the new new network operators is one of uncertainty (36).  For 
example, uncertainty arises regarding the ability of the new company to 
organise and manage its entry and initial expansion; regarding future market 
 
(33) These figures are changing almost weekly.  For example, they do not reflect WorldCom’s 
acquisition of Sprint, Vodafone’s acquisition of Airtouch and Mannesman, Qwest’s acquisition of 
US West, Global Crossing’s acquisition of Frontier. In March 2000 the market capitalisation of 
Cisco briefly exceeded that of Microsoft, hitherto the world’s most valuable company. The 
figures in Exhibit 6, however, suffice to make the main point emphasised here, namely the stock 
market valuation process that has significantly increased the value of the shares of the new new 
entrant fixed network operators. 
(34) The theory of value has played a key role in economic thought from the Greeks through the 
classical political economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx to the 
neoclassical economists from the late Nineteenth Century. It may well be argued that the 
'valuation' of telecoms and Internet shares at the turn of the Twenty First Century adds further 
relevant material for the debate about the determinants of 'value'. 
(35) The same issues regarding valuation, however, also apply to new Internet companies and 
other companies that have little relevant track record. 
(36) Many years ago Frank KNIGHT (1921) drew a crucial distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. In the case of risk, probability distributions can be calculated on the basis of present 
data that can reasonably be expected to be valid for the future. These probability distributions, 
for example, provide the basis for the operations of the insurance industry. In the case of 
uncertainty, however, such probability distributions cannot be derived. This distinction, 
unfortunately, is often neglected. As KNIGHT (1921) put it, "a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' 
proper… is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.  
We shall accordingly restrict the term 'uncertainty' to cases of the non-quantitative type" (p. 20). 
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demand and the proportion of the market that the new company will be able 
to address and win; regarding the number and strength of future 
competitors; regarding the extent of the threat posed by alternative 
technologies; regarding the importance of future substitutable services; etc.  
Furthermore, to make matters worse, the new new entrants, by definition, 
begin without any track record on which analysts and investors may base 
judgments and, in addition, typically make significant losses in their set-up 
period as a result of the substantial fixed costs involved in constructing their 
networks, costs that are incurred in advance of compensating revenue being 
generated. 
Grappling with the problem of valuing the shares of a new new operator, 
the financial analyst might well be forgiven for a feeling of bewilderment at 
the concept of the 'efficient markets hypothesis'. This hypothesis holds that a 
capital market is efficient if "it fully and correctly reflects all relevant 
information in determining security prices.  Formally, the market is said to be 
efficient with respect to some information set, x, if security prices would be 
unaffected by revealing that information" (MALKIEL, 1987, p. 120).    
The first problem the financial analyst may have with this concept is that 
'information', by definition, refers to the past; it is not possible to have 
information about the future. Yet the problem arising in valuing a new new 
operator’s shares relates essentially to future magnitudes. Secondly, the 
current information set yields contradictory inferences regarding many of the 
key variables with which the financial analyst is concerned. For example, 
Chris Gent, CEO of the largest global mobile company, Vodafone, is 
adamant in his belief that mobile communications will seize a significant part 
of the market from fixed communications. Bernard Ebbers, CEO of 
WorldCom, however, was equally vehement in his rejection of this belief (37).    
In short, decision-makers in the Telecoms Industry usually confront what 
has been termed 'interpretive ambiguity' (38) in attempting to calculate the 
implications of the current information set. Interpretive ambiguity may be 
defined as existing when the information set is capable of yielding 
contradictory inferences regarding what will happen. Under such 
circumstances the decision-maker simply has no alternative but to construct 
his or her own 'visions' of what will happen in the future, based on personal 
beliefs and expectations. Rather than being able to bask in the sunshine 
 
(37) Although there was some evidence of a shift in belief when Ebbers acquired Sprint, largely 
as a result of the attraction of that company’s mobile network. 
(38) See FRANSMAN (1999).  As KNIGHT (1921) noted, "we do not react to the past stimulus, 
but to the 'image' of a future state of affairs….  We perceive the world before we react to it, and 
we react, not to what we perceive, but always to what we infer." (p.  201). 
84 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 
provided by the notion that the markets (of which she or he is an organic 
part) are 'fully and correctly reflecting all information', however, the financial 
analyst will also be uncomfortably aware of the possibility of 'vision failure', 
that is of being wrong. 
So how does the financial analyst proceed in the light of this incomplete 
information and interpretive ambiguity? (39) The answer, as a reading of the 
company reports of the leading telecoms financial analysts readily shows, is 
that the analyst 'invents' the key assumptions that drive the calculations of 
future cash flows and earnings. There is little pretence in these reports that 
the 'inventions' made 'fully and correctly reflect all information'. Rather the 
language of the analyst usually disarmingly betrays the discomfort that all 
decision-makers feel under conditions of interpretive ambiguity (40).    
 
 
 
(39) Note that the problem here is not Herbert Simon’s problem of 'bounded rationality' resulting 
from excessive information which is greater than the ability of the human mind to process that 
information. SIMON (1957) defines bounded rationality in the following way:  "the capacity of the 
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size 
of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world – or 
even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality" (p. 198). The problem being 
dealt with here is not that the 'capacity' of the human mind is 'very small' relative to the large 
amount of information that must be processed. Rather, the problem stems from the fact that the 
information set yields interpretive ambiguity in the sense that it yields contradictory inferences. 
Under these circumstances, different 'rational' people may well arrive at contradictory 
conclusions regarding what to infer and therefore how to act. 
(40) The following quotations are typical. They come from financial analysts in the research 
department of one of the best-known financial companies in a valuation of one of Europe’s best-
performing new new entrants: 
- "We are using a five-year DCF [discounted cash flow] model… in order to value [X]. Quite 
obviously, given [X’s] relative immaturity, it is impossible to value the company using 
conventional earnings ratios such as price/earnings, price/earnings relative, EPS [earnings per 
share] growth and even firm value (market capitalisation plus net debt)/EBITDA [earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation]." 
- "We are using a discount rate of 14%… At present we have assumed that further finance is 
provided through debt.  It is entirely possible that the company could choose to issue equity, but 
we have more confidence in our ability to predict future interest rates than to predict at what 
price future equity could be sold.  This does, of course, mean that interest expense could be 
overstated." 
- "We are using a terminal EBITDA multiple of 10 [in order to calculate the final share price as a 
multiple of the EBITDA].  Such a multiple suggests substantial growth in EBITDA and EPS even 
after 2003.  We believe (to the best of our ability to predict what will happen in 2004 and 
beyond) that [X] will be increasing EBITDA at 12%-15% and EPS at 15%-20% post-2003.  We 
believe that 10x terminal multiple is reasonable relative to growth profiles, the size of [X’s] 
opportunity, its network/technology advantages (fibre, SDH) and [X’s] EPS/EBITDA growth 
post-2003." 
- "Nonetheless, we realise the inherent volatility and uncertainty in attempting such a valuation 
and we have tried to perform several cross-checks in order to validate our assumptions and 
methodology, including sensitivity analysis of multiple and discount rates."  
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But it must be said that the strength of this whole valuation processes 
lies, not in its objectivity, but in the fact that the 'visions' that guide this 
invention process, and the beliefs and expectations that underlie these 
visions, are made explicit and therefore are subject to the possibility of 
disagreement on the part of those with different visions. In this way the 
conditions are created for 'a thousand flowers blooming, a thousand 
thoughts contending' – all in all a reasonable way of dealing with conditions 
of interpretive ambiguity. 
Stock market valuation, however, involves more than the attempted 
prediction of future earnings. It also involves the attempted calculation of 
how other investors will react to the same ambiguous set of information.  In 
effect, therefore, there are two evaluations questions that are being tackled.  
First, what do we, the decision-makers, expect the future earnings of the 
company will be?  Secondly, what do we think other decision-makers (e.g. 
financial analysts and investors) will say and do regarding the company? 
Given interpretive ambiguity/incomplete information, these two questions 
are independent of each other.  For example, I may believe that a company 
does not have good relative prospects but still buy its shares because I 
believe that sufficient others will disagree and will buy the shares in the 
future. In this way 'circular expectations', that is expectations of other 
peoples’ expectations, may enter into the valuation process even when the 
link between the expectations and the supporting information is tenuous.  
Under these conditions 'fashion', rather than 'information', may drive share 
prices.  It is this kind of valuation process that has driven the market value of 
many Internet start-ups aound the world.  However, tenuous as these stock 
market values may at times be, they have had a significant impact on 'real' 
variables and therefore on the evolution of the Telecoms Industry. 
An important further factor that has influenced the rapid appreciation in 
the share values of many telecoms companies has been the 'explosion in 
demand for data communications' as a result of the global adoption of the 
Internet. However, here too the invention of beliefs and visions has played a 
role. This is most apparent in the paucity of accounts that couple the 
explosion in demand with the accompanying explosion in supply (41) and 
 
(41) For example, in a public talk in 1999 a representative of WorldCom stated that "the lack of 
available bandwidth is one of the key factors driving WorldCom’s business strategy". However, 
at the same conference it was stated by another speaker that the carrying-capacity of optical 
fiber is doubling each 12 months and the carrying-capacity of wireless channels doubling every 
9 months. (Moore’s Law, established by Gordon Moore of Intel in 1965, states that the transistor 
density on a manufactured die will double each year.) By 1999 Lucent’s Bell Labs had 
succeeded in sending 1.6 trillion bits, or terabits, of information through a single fiber by using 
the dense wavelength division multiplexing technique. This is enough for 25 million 
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analyse the combined effects. A further key variable is the price elasticity of 
demand since a fall in the price of data carrying capacity as a result of the 
combined effects of the demand and supply of capacity may nonetheless, if 
the price elasticity is high enough, be accompanied by an increase in the 
total revenue of all the sellers of capacity. An additional issue, crucial in the 
valuation of individual company shares, is how successful a company will be 
in winning its share of the increased total market revenue. These factors, 
however, are seldom introduced explicitly into the valuations.  
 The Internet as a New Paradigm and the Birth of the 
     Infocommunications Industry  
In the early 1990s the Internet emerged as a commercial force, creating 
an alternative way of delivering the same or similar services to those 
provided over the conventional circuit-switched telecoms networks and, in 
addition, a host of new services.  But the Internet was far more than just an 
alternative platform; it was nothing less than a radically new paradigm in the 
area of both information and communications, changing fundamentally the 
way in which people would think of problems and solutions in this field.  
Furthermore, by inserting itself into the very fabric of the Telecoms Industry, 
the Internet brought about the metamorphosis of this industry into what will 
be termed here the Infocommunications Industry. In this section the 
emergence of the Internet and its impact on the Telecoms Industry will be 
examined.  
 
 
 
                     
conversations or 200,000 video signals simultaneously and one cable may contain a dozen or 
more such fibres.  Of course, significant uncertainty attaches to the future demand and supply 
of communications carrying capacity and to the future price elasticity of demand. Interpretive 
ambiguity is, therefore, a significant problem in this area. 
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The emergence of the Internet  (42) 
In Exhibit 6 the main landmarks of the Internet are shown. 
Exhibit 6:  Landmarks in the Evolution of the Internet   
Date Event 
1950s 1958 – ARPA founded in response to Sputnik. 
1960s Early 1960s - Packet-switching invented independently by Paul Baran, Rand 
Corporation in the US, and Donald Davies, National Physical Laboratory, UK, 
based on the notion of 'message switching' that went back to the postal and 
telegraph systems. 
1962 - ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) founded. 
1967 - ARPANET project started. 
1970s 1972 - ARPANET demonstrated at the First International Conference on 
Computer Communications (ICCC). 
- First commercial packet-switching network introduced. 
- E-mail starts to be widely adopted. 
1973 - Robert Kahn approaches Vinton Cerf to develop a system for 
Internetworking and they outline the basic Internet architecture. 
1974 - Initial version of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) specified. 
- AT&T declines to take over operation of ARPANET. 
1975 - Ethernet created by Robert Metcalfe. 
1977 - ARPANET demonstrates its first multinetwork connection, connecting the 
networks ARPANET, PRNET, and SATNET. 
1978 - IP (Internet Protocol) established. 
  1990 - First incarnation of the World Wide Web, created by Tim Berners Lee, 
Robert Cailliau and others at CERN, Switzerland. 
1993 - Marc Andreesen and team develop improved Web browser, Mosaic. 
1994 - Andreesen and team set up commercial version of Mosaic, Netscape. 
1995 - On May 26, 1995 Bill Gates issues memo, ‘The Internet Tidal Wave’, that 
acknowledges that Microsoft will have to adapt all its systems to the Internet. 
ARPA and time-shared computing 
The institution that gave birth to the network that was eventually to evolve 
into the Internet was ARPA (the Advanced Research Projects Agency) that 
was established in 1958 in the US in reponse to the Russian launch of 
Sputnik. From 1962 to 1964 ARPA, under J.C.R. Licklider, encouraged 
 
(42) This section draws heavily on the account of the evolution of packet switching given by 
Lawrence Roberts, who joined ARPA in January 1967 and managed its computer research 
programmes - see ROBERTS (1978) - and on Janet Abbate’s (1999) excellent Inventing the 
Internet.  See also NORBERG & O’NEILL (1996). 
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through its funding the development of time-sharing computer systems at 
leading universities and government-funded research laboratories in the US.  
"One of Licklider’s strong interests was to link these time-shared computers 
together through a widespread computer network" (ROBERTS, 1978, p. 1308). 
This interest was motivated by the high cost of time-share computers and 
the desire to make more efficient use of this resource. The question that this 
raised, however, was: How should it be done? Licklider’s interest and the 
considerable research funding controlled by ARPA and its Information 
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO), established in 1962 to further 
advanced research in computing, served to stimulate discussion and debate 
around the questions of how to construct computer networks to facilitate 
interactive computing between time-shared computers. 
learly, if time-shared computers were to be linked, a communications 
system would be needed in order to facilitate the flows of data between the 
mainframe computers (43). This, in turn, raised the question of what kind of 
communications system would be suitable. 
Circuit-switching versus packet-switching 
The obvious way to link distant time-shared computers was through 
leased telephone lines. However, the cost of using these leased lines was 
high.  Apart from AT&T’s monopoly over leased lines, a major determinant of 
the high cost was the technology that was used, namely a pre-allocation 
technique called circuit-switching according to which a fixed bandwidth is 
pre-allocated for the duration of the connection. While this technique was 
fairly well-suited for the transmission of voice calls, it was not particularly 
well-adapted for the transmission of interactive data traffic that occurs in 
short bursts and that can result in as much as 90 percent of the pre-
allocated bandwidth being wasted. This, in turn, raised the question of 
whether there were any more cost-effective alternatives. 
It had long been realised that an alternative to pre-allocation existed in 
the dynamic-allocation of transmission bandwidth. This method had 
traditionally been used in postal mail systems and the telegraph. The 
method involved collecting and storing messages at a node in the network 
and then, when sufficient messages had been accumulated, sending the 
messages in bulk on to the next node in the network.  This made better use 
of transmission capacity compared to the pre-allocation technique that was 
 
(43) As Roberts put it, "the interest in creating a new communications system grew out of the 
development of time-sharing and Licklider’s special interest in the 1964-65 period" (p. 1308). 
M. FRANSMAN 89 
wasteful since it allocated capacity even when no messages were being 
transmitted.  The problem with dynamic allocation, however, was that many 
sorting and routing decisions had to be made by human operators and this 
entailed a high cost in using this technique. 
The advent of relatively inexpensive computers, however, created the 
possibility of removing this obstacle to dynamic allocation. It is here that the 
computer revolution, and the linked revolutions in computer storage and 
processing, enters the story of the evolution of the Internet. In 1965, the time 
when discussions were being held regarding an appropriate communications 
system for linking time-shared computers, DEC introduced its PDP-8 
minicomputer that would drastically reduce computing costs compared to the 
mainframes that then dominated. This computer revolution gave a new 
breath of life to dynamic allocation.  In the words of Roberts: 
The "economic tradeoff [between pre-allocation/circuit switching and dynamic 
allocation/packet switching] is simple: if lines are cheap, use circuit switching; if 
computing is cheap, use packet-switching." (p. 1307). 
However, Roberts also noted that this trade-off, recognisable with 
hindsight, was by no means acknowledged at the time: 
 "Although today this seems obvious, before packet switching had been 
demonstrated technically and proven economical, the tradeoff was never recognized, 
let alone analyzed." (p. 1307). 
The alternative of dynamic allocation/packet-switching as an appropriate 
technology for the communications system lining time-shared computers, 
however, did not emerge only as a theoretical possibility, based on old 
postal and telegraph systems. Coincidentally, research in this area had been 
undertaken independently by two researchers, one in the US and one in the 
UK. It was their research, and the feasibilities that it demonstrated, rather 
than the purely theoretical superiority of dynamic allocation, that paved the 
way for the adoption of packet-switching as the basis for the 
communications system chosen for ARPANET, the network that would be 
constructed to link the time-shared computers in ARPA’s computer research 
programmes. 
At the Rand Corporation, Paul Baran in the early 1960s did research for 
the US Air Force on a military communications system for data and voice.  
"The Air Force’s primary goal was to produce a totally survivable system that 
contained no critical central components" (ROBERTS, 1978, p. 1308). The 
injunction against centralised control of the system followed from the desire 
to make the system less vulnerable (i.e. 'survivable') to Russian attack.  
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Baran’s research, published in August 1964, proposed a fully decentralised 
(i.e. distributed) communications system based on packet switching/dynamic 
allocation. However, his "report sat largely ignored for many years until 
packet switching was re-discovered and applied by others" (ROBERTS, 1978, 
p. 1308).   
In the UK in the early 1960s, at the government-funded National Physical 
Laboratory, Donald Davies was also developing a communications system 
based on packet-switching/dynamic allocation designed for interactive 
computing (ABBATE, 1999, p. 23). In autumn 1965 Davies sponsored a 
conference reporting on his results that was attended by Lawrence Roberts 
(who would join ARPA in January 1967 and assume management of its 
computer research programmes) and others from MIT. It was at this 
conference that Roberts and his colleagues decided that dynamic allocation 
should be used in ARPANET.   
"Almost immediately after the 1965 meeting, Donald Davies conceived of the details 
of a store-and-forward packet switching system, and in a June 1966 description of his 
proposal coined the term 'packet' to describe the 128-byte blocks being moved 
around inside the network. Davies circulated his proposed network design throughout 
the UK in late 1965 and 1966. It was only after this distribution that he discovered 
Paul Baran’s 1964 report" (44).  
Communications engineers versus computer professionals 
However, what was obvious to some of the key computer scientists in the 
National Physical Laboratory and the ARPA computer research programme 
was by no means obvious to those in the telecoms industry whose ‘visions’, 
and the beliefs and interpretations they embodied, had little room for a 
reversion to what they disparagingly saw as outdated dynamic allocation 
techniques.  In the words of Lawrence Roberts: 
"In the early 1960s, preallocation [i.e. circuit-switching] was so clearly the proven and 
accepted technique that no communications engineer ever seriously considered 
reverting to what was considered an obsolete technique, dynamic allocation. Such 
techniques had been proven both uneconomic and unresponsive 20-80 years 
previously, so why reconsider them? The very fact that no great technological 
breakthrough was required to implement packet switching was another factor 
weighing against its acceptance by the engineering community." 
 
(44) ROBERTS (1978), p. 1308. According to ABBATE (1999) it was in March, 1966 that Davies 
first presented his ideal publicly to an audience of computing, telecoms, and military people and 
a man from the British Ministry of Defence gave his the surprising news about Baran’s 1964 
report (p. 27). 
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It was only from a group of outsiders, with a fundamentally different 
starting point, set of problems, and set of beliefs and interpretations, that a 
new alternative technology, based on dynamic allocation, could emerge: 
"What was required was the total re-evaluation of the performance and economics of 
dynamic-allocation systems, and their application to an entirely different task. Thus, it 
remained for outsiders to the communications industry, computer professionals, to 
develop packet switching in response to a problem for which they needed a better 
answer: communicating data to and from computers" (ROBERTS, 1978, p. 1307).  
In evaluating Roberts’s evaluation of the respective role played by 
'computer professionals' and 'communications engineers' it is worth being 
reminded of the telecoms research agenda that existed at the time in the 
field of switching. In the mid-1950s the first electronic space-division 
switching research programme incorporating stored progam control (SPC) 
was introduced by Bell Laboratories. This resulted in the first trial electronic 
SPC switch in 1960 and the first commercial switch, AT&T’s No.1 ESS in 
1965.   
But no sooner were the first electronic space-division switches being 
introduced than they were in the process of being displaced by the next 
generation of central office switches, namely by time-division digital 
switches.  Although the first research on time-division switching went back to 
the work of Reeves in 1938 and Deloraine in 1945, it was only in 1959 that 
the Essex Project in Bell Labs demonstrated the feasibility of time-division 
switching.  This was followed by the development of pulse-code modulation 
(PCM) transmission systems in the early 1960s and the beginning of 
research in Bell Labs on AT&T’s first digital switch, the No.4 ESS, the first 
laboratory model of which was introduced in November 1972. In 1976 
Northern Telecom (now Nortel) began development of its first relatively small 
digital switch, the DMS, which was commissioned in 1977, about four years 
earlier than AT&T’s equivalent switch, the No.5 ESS, that was introduced in 
1982. As this brief account makes clear, therefore, the telecoms engineering 
community were very much focused on the development of electronic space-
division switching, and then time-division digital switching, both within the 
broader context of circuit-switching, at the time that the debates were 
occurring in the ARPA community about the feasibility of packet-switching 
for the communications system that would connect time-shared  
computers (45).  
 
(45) This discussion on telecoms switching comes from FRANSMAN (1995), Chapter 3, 
specifically from Fig. 3.1, p. 47, and Fig. 3.3, p. 50.  See also CHAPUIS & JOEL (1990). 
92 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 
In October 1972, the first packet switched network was publicly 
demonstrated at the first meeting of the International Conference on 
Computer Communications (ICCC) in Washington, DC when a complete 
ARPANET node was installed in the conference hotel with about 40 active 
terminals permitting access to dozens of computers in various parts of the 
US. This provided proof that packet switching could really work and 
managed to convince many working in the networking field. However, some 
still remained to be persuaded.  According to Roberts, in an article published 
in 1978: 
"AT&T evidenced even less interest in packet switching than many of the PTT’s in 
other countries. AT&T and its research organization, Bell Laboratories, have never to 
my knowledge published any research on packet switching. ARPA approached AT&T 
in the early 1970s to see if AT&T would be interested in taking over the ARPANET 
and offering a public packet switched services, but AT&T decline". (ROBERTS, 1978, 
p. 1310) (46). 
The Internet protocol 
It was in this way that a new communications paradigm was born based 
on packet-switching and offering a radically new approach to the 
communication of both data and voice (47). In 1968 virtually all interactive 
data communication networks were circuit-switched. By 1978, however, 
virtually all new data networks being built throughout the world were based 
on packet-switching, a remarkable rate of diffusion for a radically new 
technology (ROBERTS, 1978, p. 1307).  
In the spring of 1973 ARPA researchers Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf got 
together to consider how to interconnect dissimilar networks (48). This led 
eventually to TCP/IP. As shown in Exhibit 7, in 1974 the initial version of 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) was specified. In 1978: 
 
 
(46) See ABBATE (1999), p.137 for further discussion. 
(47) Roberts’s prediction in 1978 regarding voice communications by packet-switching are 
apropos: "The economic advantage of dynamic-allocation over pre-allocation will soon become 
so fundamental and clear in all areas of communications, including voice, that it is not hard to 
project (predict?) the same radical transition of technology will occur in voice communications 
as has occurred in data communications… the obvious solution would be an integrated packet 
switching network that provides both voice and data services…. Given the huge fixed 
investment in voice equipment in place today, the transition to voice [packet] switching may be 
considerably slower and more difficult.  There is no way, however, to stop it from happening." 
(p. 1312). In 1995, an Israeli-owned startup, based in Silicon Valley, Vocaltech, introduced the 
first software allowing for voice over the Internet. 
(48) See ABBATE (1999), Chapter 4, From ARPANET to Internet. 
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"They proposed splitting the TCP protocol into two separate parts: a host-to-host 
protocol (TCP) and an internetwork protocol (IP)... IP would simply pass individual 
packets between machines (from host to packet switch, or between packet switches); 
TCP would be responsible for ordering these packets into reliable connections 
between hosts" (ABBATE, 1999, p. 130).    
In this way, the transfer of packets across different networks, using 
different technologies, was facilitated.  
The proliferation of the Internet 
When did the realisation first dawn that the Internet has become a 
Schumpeterian tidal wave of creation-destruction? One way to tackle this 
question is to examine the reactions of Vinton Cerf, often referred to as one 
of the fathers of the Internet, who, as noted earlier, co-wrote the Internet 
Protocol (IP) with Robert Kahn and made major contributions to the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Cerf has said that in 1977 he 
"Assumed that [ARPANET] was a research project that would probably 
never get bigger than 128 networks" (49).  By 1996 the Internet was a 
network of some 50,000 networks. 
When did Cerf first realise that the innovations that he and his co-workers 
made would form the basis for a fundamental shift in the way in which we 
think of information and communications?  The answer is between 1989 and 
1991 as Cerf makes clear: 
"We now know that the lift-off point for exponential growth [in the Internet] came 
around 1988, though it wasn’t obvious at the time. I certainly didn’t sense it in the 
early days of research, 22 years ago. But I remember vividly walking into a trade 
show in 1989, one of the InerOp shows in San Jose, and looking at the booths, and 
this was the first time that I had seen really expensive booths being put up.  It was 
obvious that the vendors were spending very significant dollars and that there was 
something serious going on. And then the second epiphany, if you can call it that, 
came a couple of years later when the first commercial service companies started to 
show up. This really confirmed my increasing expectation that this was turning into a 
serious business." 
And how did he feel when he realised what was happening?  "My first 
reaction was something like, 'Holy Shit'." 
In 1990, as shown in Exhibit 7, the first incarnation of the World Wide 
Web emerged, created by Tim Berners Lee, Robert Cailliau and others at 
CERN, the particle-physics research establishment in Switzerland. In 
 
(49) This and the following quotations from Vinton Cerf come from CERF (1996). 
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January 1993 Mosaic was introduced, the first World Wide Web browser, 
based on research done at the University of Illinois. In April 1994 Mosaic 
Communications was established, a firm that soon became Netscape 
Communications Corp. that was floated on the stock exchange on August 8, 
1995 (the shares increasing in value on the first day from $28 to $58). 
There is evidence that Bill Gates began to understand the implications of 
the Internet only in 1995.  Although Gates and Microsoft were immersed in 
the development and shipping date of Windows 95 (eventually released on 
August 24, 1995) and until mid-1995 did not pay too much attention to the 
Internet, Gates’ vision of the future of computing and Microsoft had come to 
encompass the importance of networked computing.  On October 6, 1994 
Gates wrote a memorandum titled "Sea Change" that spelled out plans for 
networked computing my Microsoft. Earlier, in May 1993, Gates had 
approved work on Marvel, an online service that would be offered by 
Microsoft (and later became MSN).  Marvel, however, was not intended to 
be Internet-compatible. 
Until early to mid-1995, however, it is clear that Gates saw Microsoft as 
the dog of networked computing and the Internet, at best, as a rather 
insignificant tail.  In Gates’ own words: 
"I wouldn’t say it was clear [at this time] that [the Internet] was going to explode over 
the next couple of years.  If you’d asked me then if most TV ads will have URLs [Web 
addresses] in them, I would have laughed" (50).  
By the automn of 1995, however, some 20 million people were accessing 
the Internet without using Microsoft’s software and on May 23, 1995 Sun’s 
Java software language was officially released which, being platform-
independent, further threatened to by-pass Microsoft’s systems. By the latter 
date, however, the alarm bells that had for some time been ringing inside 
Microsoft (in the form of several younger staff, more in touch with the rapidly 
growing adoption of Internet technologies, particularly on American 
campuses) were heard by Gates and the rest of the leadership.  On May 26, 
1995 Gates issued a memorandum, "The Internet Tidal Wave", that finally 
confirmed his conversion to the view that the Internet had become the dog, 
with Microsoft, after all, only its tail. 
 
(50) Business Week, July 15, 1996, pp. 38-44. 
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The Birth of the Infocommunications Industry 
How has the Internet changed the Telecoms Industry and transformed it 
into the Infocommunications Industry? The Internet has had four major 
effects on the Telecoms Industry that together have fundamentally changed 
this industry.  Exhibit 7 shows in the form of a layer model the main features 
of the Infocommunications Industry. 
Exhibit 7:  The Infocommunications Industry: A Layer Model 
Layer Activity Example companies 
VI Customers - 
V Applications Layer, including contents 
packaging 
(e.g. Web design, on-line information 
services, broadcasting services, etc.) 
Bloombergs, Reuters, AOL-
Time Warner, MSN, 
Newscorp, etc. 
IV Navigation & Middleware Layer 
(e.g. browsers, portals, search engines, 
directory assistance, security, electronic 
payment, etc.) 
Yahoo, Netscape, etc. 
III Connectivity Layer 
(e.g. Internet access, Web hosting) 
IAPs and ISPs 
IP INTERFACE 
II Network Layer 
(e.g. optical fiber network, DSL local 
network, radio access network, Ethernet, 
frame relay, ISDN, ATM, etc.) 
AT&T, BT, NTT, WorldCom, 
Qwest, Colt, Energis, etc. 
I Equipment & Software Layer(e.g. switches, 
transmission equipment, routers, servers, 
CPE, billing software etc.) 
Nortel, Lucent, Cisco, Nokia, 
etc. 
First, the Internet has established that packet-switching and the IP 
(Internet Protocol) networks in which it is embodied constitute a superior 
technology compared with circuit switched technologies, not only for data but 
also, as Lawrence Roberts correctly foresaw at least by 1978 (see above), 
for voice. Indeed, to go even further, the Internet has created a 
fundamentally new paradigm for the understanding of information and 
communications problems and solutions. 
Secondly, as shown in Exhibit 7, TCP/IP has created a bridge, facilitating 
easy and cheap interoperability across radically different networks using 
radically different technologies. KAVASSALIS, LEE & BAILEY (199xx) have 
explained the importance of the TCP/IP interface using the analogy of 
containerisation in the Transport Industry.  Pre-containerisation, high costs 
were involved in moving goods between different transport networks such as 
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road, rail, ship, and air.  The advent of containerisation, however, facilitated 
a smooth interface between these networks, increasing the degree of 
interoperability between them and significantly lowering the cost of 
interoperability.  Likewise, TCP/IP has facilitated the transfer of bits across 
the different networks, embodying significantly different technologies, of the 
Network Layer (Layer II). 
TCP/IP has produced several important consequences: 
• Easy and cheap communications is possible globally across a huge 
number of interconnected networks 
• … which has given greater effect to global standardisation based 
around the Internet protocols and practices 
• … which has created a global knowledge-base, facilitating the 
creation of further knowledge (as will be discussed in more detail below) 
• and competition between networks, technologies and services has 
been greatly increased. 
Thirdly, TCP/IP has provided a platform for three largely new layers of 
services, as shown in Exhibit 7. Not only this, it has created the possibility for 
the emergence of a new industrial category of facilities-less service 
providers, specialised in one or more of the service layers, who are able to 
provide services using this platform while ignoring what else goes on in the 
network layer, Layer 2. In turn, this has created new potential for the 
Infocommunications Industry to become vertically-specialised like the 
computer industry did from the 1980s (51). For example, in Layer 3 the 
function of connectivity is provided and with it new services, such as Internet 
access and Web hosting. In Layer 4 the function of navigation is provided 
and navigational systems such as browsers, portals, and search engines.  
Layer 4 also contains the 'middleware' that, sitting on top of Layers 1 to 3, 
provides the software that facilitates the applications in Layer 5, for example 
software systems that provide security (such as fire walls) and facilitate 
electronic payment. 
The fourth way in which the Internet has changed the Telecoms Industry 
is through the integration of the Computer Industry that it has facilitated, 
hence justifying the nomenclature, the Infocommunications Industry. As 
shown in Exhibit 7, computer hardware and software and computer networks 
 
(51) Whether the Infocommunications Industry will become more vertically specialised, to what 
extent and when, and what the implications are for incumbents, new operators and specialist 
facilities-less service providers, are key questions the causes and implications of which are 
addressed in TelecomVisions.Com. 
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fit into the Infocommunications Industry in all the layers.  For example,  
Layer 1 contains computers such as routers and servers and software systems 
such as billing software. The Internet, as a 'network of networks', is an integral 
part of the Network Layer, Layer 2.  All the services, provided in the service 
layers, Layers 3 to 5, depend on computer hardware and software.  At the same 
time, elements of both the Old and the New Telecoms Industry have also been 
integrated into the layers of the Infocommunications Industry, particularly in 
Layers 1 and 2. From the perspective of the layer model of the 
Infocommunications Industry, therefore, it is possible to give a specific meaning 
to the widely used (perhaps over-used) concept of 'convergence' between 
computing and telecommunications. 
To conclude, the Internet that emerged from the attempts to link time-
shared computers, an event that was remote to the Telecoms Industry, has 
fundamentally transformed this industry, turning it into the 
Infocommunications Industry.  How the Infocommunications Industry itself 
will evolve in the future is the key question that is tackled in 
TelecomVisions.Com. 
The technological and learning regimes in the Infocommunications 
Industry 
The innovation system in the Infocommunications Industry has also 
undergone a fundamental transformation. Some of the important changes 
are shown in Exhibit 8 that contrasts the innovation systems in the Old 
Telecoms Industry, shown earlier in Exhibit 2, and the Infocommunications 
Industry. 
Exhibit 8:  The Innovation Systems in the Infocommunications Industry 
and the Old Telecoms Industry 
Info’Coms Industry Old Telecoms Industry 
Open innovation system Closed innovation system 
Low entry barriers High entry barriers 
Many innovators Few innovators 
Common knowledge base Fragmented knowledge base 
High-powered incentives Medium-powered incentives 
Rapid, concurrent, innovation; 
New forms of innovation (e.g. 
concurrent co-operative innovation by 
remote innovators) 
Slow, sequential, innovation: 
Research – prototype – trials - cutover 
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As is apparent from Exhibit 8, the innovation system in the 
Infocommunications Industry differs fundamentally from that which existed in 
the Old Telecoms Industry. To begin with, in the Infocommunications 
Industry the innovation system is open in the sense that virtually anyone can 
create innovations within the industry. In marked contrast, in the Old 
Telecoms Industry the innovation process was open only to the monopoly 
network operator and its favoured suppliers. The barriers to entry into the 
innovation system (i.e. the barriers constraining individuals or firms from 
becoming innovators) in the Infocommunications Industry are low. Entry is 
greatly facilitated by the fact that there is widespread common knowledge of 
the main operating systems, software languages and protocols that are used 
in the various layers of the industry. This common knowledge is largely the 
result of globalised de facto and de jure standardisation (e.g. TCP/IP, html 
[hypertext markup language], or WAP [wireless application protocol]). In the 
Old Telecoms Industry, as noted earlier, many standards and practices 
differed markedly from country to country, resulting in a fragmented 
knowledge base. The increasing importance of software, together with the 
common knowledge base, and the relatively low cost of producing many 
software applications has meant that there are a large number of software 
innovators in the Infocommunications Industry (52).  
Furthermore, in this industry there are high-powered incentives to 
innovate. Internet-related innovations have a particularly large potential 
global market and successful innovations may be extremely richly rewarded. 
With so many innovators competing with each other the rate of innovation is 
much faster than it was in the Old Telecoms Industry.  In addition, the very 
nature of packet-switched networks has facilitated concurrent, rather than 
sequential, innovation. In the Old Telecoms Industry a laborious process of 
trials was necessary before new equipment could be introduced into the 
network. If equipment in a circuit-switched network fails, the service on that 
network is disrupted. It was for this reason that exceptionally high reliability 
was a necessary requirement in the Old Telecoms Industry and, accordingly, 
equipment had to be exhaustively tested. However, in a packet-switched 
network the fact that packets can be routed in many alternative ways adds 
greater robustness to the network and means that many kinds of equipment 
and software can be tested on-line at a far earlier stage in the development 
process than was possible in the Old Telecoms Industry. This too has 
speeded up the innovation process. 
 
(52) For the example of innovators in the field of live video over the Internet, see FRANSMAN 
(2000). 
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In the Infocommunications Industry new forms of innovation have been 
created using the Internet as a ubiquitous platform for innovation. One 
significant example is the concurrent co-operative development of the UNIX-
based operating system, Linux, by a large number of remotely located co-
innovators who do not even know each other and have no visible hand of co-
ordination. The main features of this remarkable new process of innovation 
are summarised in Exhibit 9. 
Exhibit 9:  Co-operative Innovation by Remotely Located Innovators: The Case of Linux 
Product UNIX-based operating system 
Founder Linus Torvalds, Finnish, began as university project in 1991 
Competitors Microsoft’s Windows NT 
Price Linux: Free on Internet; $50 on CD 
Windows NT: $800 
Distribution Given away on Internet i.e. a Public Good, therefore cannot be 
bought by Microsoft.  Many users of Linux make their own additions 
to the operating system which they also put, free, into the public 
domain. 
Format Linux:  Source code – open, expandable by user 
Windows NT: Binary code – unintelligible to user 
Applications Mainly servers 
Customers Linux: 7 million, including Netscape, Intel, IBM 
Microsoft: 300 million 
Performance Linux in 1998 the fourth most often installed version of UNIX 
 Mobile Communications  
In the late-1990s civilian cellular mobile communications took off around 
the world, becoming the most rapidly-growing telecommunications service.  
The UK company, Vodafone, acquired Airtouch of the US in 1999 and 
Mannesman of Germany in 2000, becoming the largest global mobile 
operator. NTT’s majority-owned mobile subsidiary, NTT DoCoMo, introduced 
the first mobile Internet access service, i-mode, in February, 1999. By March 
2000 the company had attracted 5 million customers in Japan. Shortly 
thereafter, NTT DoCoMo became the most valuable company on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange and one of the most valuable telecoms companies in the 
world, even more valuable than its parent, NTT. In the late 1990s efforts 
began to develop a global standard for so-called Third Generation mobile, 
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capable of providing Internet access at speeds of 2 megabit per second 
compared to the 9.6 kilobit offered by Second Generation systems. 
Interpretive ambiguity and mobile communications 
At the turn of the millenium it seemed obvious that consumers in many 
circumstances had a strong preference for mobile communications.  
Predictions of future penetration rates – that reached as much as 50 percent 
in the most advanced countries – became commonplace.  A decade and a 
half earlier, however, considerable interpretive ambiguity reigned regarding 
consumer preferences in this area, as is clear from Exhibit 10. 
Exhibit 10:  Interpretive Ambiguity and Mobile Communications 
1970s-
1980s 
Despite inventing the cellular mobile system, Bell Labs downgrades research on 
radio communications that it deems to be an inferior transmission technology. 
1984 At the time of its divestiture a Senior Executive of AT&T expresses the company’s 
view that there is little future in mobile communications (1). 
“When I joined Ericsson in 1984 Radio Communications was something odd 
happening on the outskirts of Stockholm”, Kurt Hellstrom, President, Ericsson (2). 
Early 
1980s 
AT&T asks consultancy company McKinsey how many cellular phones there will be 
in the world in 2000. 
McKinsey’s answer: total global market = 900,000. 
In 2000 there are about 400 million mobile phones globally (and about 180 million 
PCs) (3). 
1992 GSM standard agreed by European standards bodies and firms. 
1994 Sam Ginn quits as CEO of Baby Bell Pacific Telesis to head the company’s spun-off 
mobile operations renamed AirTouch.  But AirTouch’s share price languishes. 
1997 Demand for mobile telephony explodes globally. 
1999 British Vodafone acquires AirTouch forming the largest global mobile telecoms 
operator (and acquires Mannesmann in 2000).  Players talk of possibility of mobile 
replacing fixed communications. 
1999 UMTS third generation mobile standard agreed by Europe, Japan & US, making 
high-speed Internet on mobile phones possible. 
(1) Financial Times, February 22, 1999. 
(2) Financial Times, July 26, 1999. 
(3) The Economist, October 9th, 1999. 
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Co-evolving consumer demand 
As Exhibit 10 makes clear, it is inappropriate to see consumer tastes and 
preferences as always fully formed, with firms responding to the consumer 
demand thus generated. Instead, there exists a process of co-evolution, 
frequently involving substantial interpretive ambiguity, with consumer tastes 
and preferences, products and services, technology (and sometimes 
science), firms, and related institutions, interacting and co-evolving within the 
context of the various selection environments that select and reinforce some 
of them while rejecting others. In some cases, indeed, products and services 
are developed before consumer demand for them exists, with the intention of 
creating the very demand that the product or service is intended to satisfy.  
Some times these efforts succeed, other times they fail.  Exhibit 11 depicts 
four possible evolutionary paths, with examples from the field of 
infocommunications. 
Exhibit 11.  Evolutionary Paths for Co-evolving Consumer Demand 
 
 
- Mobile cellular   
communications 
- E-mail 
Video-phone 
- Many Video-on-
demand 
 
Mobile cellular communications, shown in the top left-hand cell, are an 
example of a set of services/products/technologies that were developed well 
in advance of the huge global mass demand that would much later emerge.  
The concept of cellular communications was invented in Bell Laboratories.  
The first proposal to use cellular systems in the field of mobile 
communications in order to make most efficient use of the limited spectrum 
was put forward in 1947 "and discussed subsequently in a number of 
internal Bell Laboratories memoranda. These ideas formed the basis for 
worldwide cellular radio. The first publication was by H.J. Shulte, Jr., and 
W.A. Cornell [of Bell Labs] in 1960" (MILLMAN, 1984, p. 235).  
 
OUTCOME 
  Successful                 Unsuccessful 
DEVELOPMENT     Before large demand
  OF 
PRODUCT/               After 
TECHNOLOGY       large demand 
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Only a decade later, in 1970, the first civilian standard for modern cellular 
telephony began to be specified in Scandinavia, leading to the Nordic Mobile 
Telephony (NMT) standard that was introduced in 1981.  However, although 
demand for cellular mobile telephony in Scandinavia exceeded initial 
expectations, the general feeling, as indicated by the statement from Kurt 
Hellstrom, President of Ericsson, in Exhibit 10 was that mobile 
communications were not particularly economically significant. Indeed, 
Ericsson’s mobile division was very much the 'ugly sister' to the company’s 
other division, based on the company’s digital central office switch, the AXE, 
used at that time for fixed communications. The small market for Ericsson’s 
equipment in mobile communications was insufficient to deflect the company 
from its vision for the 1980s of a merging of telecommunications and the 
paperless office, a vision that turned out to be incorrect. It was only in 1990 
that Ericsson’s new CEO, Lars Ramqvist, made mobile communications the 
main priority and reorganised the company accordingly (53).  
E-mail is a similar example of a service being developed will in advance 
of a large market demand. More accurately, e-mail was an unintended by-
product of the ARPANET project and only emerged initially as a convenient 
way for the researchers working on this project to communicate. Once the 
service was available its usefulness quickly became apparent and rapidly 
diffused, first amongst the ARPANET researchers, then amongst their other 
colleagues at their universities and research institutes, and, finally, amongst 
a broader community.  Indeed, "Email [introduced in 1972] quickly became 
the network’s most popular and influential service, surpassing all 
expectations" (54). 
A very different co-evolutionary path for consumer tastes, preferences, 
services, products and technologies is represented by the top right-hand 
cell. An example is the video-phone. The details of this example are 
summarised in Exhibit 12. 
 
(53) "In 1990 Ericsson got a new CEO, namely Lars Ramqvist, who came from Ericsson Radio 
Systems.  As he came from radio communication and not switches, choosing him to be top 
manager was in many ways a recognition of the growing importance of wireless 
telecommunications to the concern as a whole, and indeed Ramqvist immediately focused 
Ericsson on that."  McKELVEY (1999), p. 17.  See also McKELVEY & TEXIER (1999). 
(54) ABBATE (1999), p. 107.  "The popularity of email was not foreseen by the ARPANET’s 
planners.  Roberts had not included electronic mail in the original blueprint for the network.  In 
fact, in 1967 he had called the ability to send messages between users ‘not an important 
motivation for a network of scientific computers… Why then was the popularity of email such a 
surprise? One answer is that it represented a radical shift in the ARPANET’s identity and 
purpose. The rationale for building the network had focused on providing access to computers 
rather than to people." ABBATE (1999), pp. 108-109. 
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Exhibit 12:  Vision of the Video-Phone 
Assumption People who can hear each other will also want to see each 
other 
1950s Bell Labs begins work on video-telephony 
1964 – Word Fair, New York AT&T demonstrates the video-phone 
1960s – AT&T’s Business Plan By 1980s video-phone market = 1% of residential, 3% of 
business market 
1973 AT&T withdraws video-phone after spending up to $0.5 
billion 
1992 AT&T reintroduces video-phone with limited success 
M. Katz, Former FCC Chief 
Economist, 1996 
"Many at 1964 World Fair touted video-phone as next big 
thing.  I think they were right, just a bit premature." 
Interpretive ambiguity "The price is too high and people are not used to it" versus 
"People often feel uncomfortable under close visual 
scrutiny and don’t want it" 
 
By contrast, video-on-demand (VOD) represents an example of a service 
developed after the emergence of a large market demand for video 
recordings (using the VHS format).  For many VOD was the much sought-
after 'killer application' for the 'multi-media' objectives that were very popular 
in the Telecoms Industry of the late-1980s, before the widespread adoption 
of the Internet.  It was VOD that stimulated numerous trials around the world, 
and indeed the local access technology, XDSL (digital subscriber loop), 
designed to carry broadband signals over local copper wires, owes its origin 
to VOD-related research and trials.  However, like the video-phone, by the 
dawn of the new millenium there was very little demand for VOD. 
As these different evolutionary paths and examples suggest, it is 
necessary to analyse consumer tastes and preferences, and therefore 
market demand, as an endogenous part of the co-evolutionary process, a 
process that seldom settles down 'in equilibrium' for very long but which, on 
the contrary, is usually in a process of flux. 
Scandinavia leads 
As noted earlier, work on the first standard for civilian cellular mobile 
communications began in Scandinavia in 1970, involving the PTTs (national 
network operators) and specialist equipment suppliers of Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden.  Although a fair amount of research was undertaken in 
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telecoms laboratories around the world at this time, it was Scandinavia that 
took the lead in developing and using mobile communications. Precisely why 
this commitment first occurred in Scandinavia is still unclear. Explanatory 
hypotheses include the large, weather-prone countries of Finland, Norway 
and Sweden; the widely distributed population of these countries; and the 
far-sighted and pro-active nature of the PTTs, particularly Televerket with its 
own sophisticated radio research laboratories; and the co-operation of the 
PTTs that resulted in the first international mobile standard, NMT, which, in 
turn, allowed Scandinavians to use their mobile phones in any of the 
participating countries. 
However, it is clear that whatever the explanation for Scandinavia’s early 
entry, there were regional dynamic increasing returns that allowed 
Scandinavia to maintain its lead in several important areas into the new 
millenium. One of these areas is penetration rates where Scandinavian 
countries still have the highest rates in the world. Another is the 
Scandinavian companies, notably Ericsson and Nokia, that have come to 
dominate not only European but also global mobile equipment markets, 
overcoming the opposition of powerful rival companies such as Motorola and 
NEC. These dynamic increasing returns at the level of the firm have been 
traced by McKELVEY & TEXIER (1999) for the case of Ericsson and for 
Ericsson and Nokia by McKELVEY (1999) (55). The strength of these 
companies resulting from dynamic increasing returns has allowed them to 
play a highly influential role in shaping the W-CDMA (code division multiple 
access) standard for Third Generation mobile communications adopted by 
Europe and Japan and by a few operators in the US (KANO, 2000).  
Europe and Japan Rule - The US Lags (56) 
Exhibit 13 shows the diffusion of second generation mobile systems in 
Europe, Japan and the US.  
 
 
 
(55) Ericsson was founded in 1876 to produce telephones using technologies developed by 
Alexander Graham Bell but not patented in Sweden.  McKELVEY & TEXIER (1999). 
(56) This section draws heavily on KANO (2000). The data in Exhibit 13 comes from Kano 
(2000), Table 2 and Figure 2. The author is grateful to Professor Kano for access to this 
information and for numerous discussions on telecommunications in general and mobile 
communications in particular. 
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Exhibit 13: Diffusion of Second Generation Mobile Systems 
in Europe, Japan and North America 
Region 
 
 
 
No. of subscribers 
1997 
No. of subscribers 
1998 
  Absolute 
No. (mn) 
 Absolute No. 
(mn) 
Per 
1000 
Western Europe 387 46.3 12.0 93.5 24.2 
Japan 126 36.2 28.7 47.3 37.5 
North 
America 
300 5.5 1.8 27.2 9.1 
Source: Kano (2000) 
As can be seen from Exhibit 13, in mobile communications Europe and 
Japan rule while the US lags.  Several qualifications, however, must be 
made regarding the data in Exhibit 13. First, Western Europe includes 
countries with the highest penetration rates in the world, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, as well as countries with much lower rates, such as 
Greece and Portugal, and therefore is not strictly comparable with Japan 
and North America which is largely the US.  Secondly, one of the reasons for 
the low penetration rates in the US is that the data is limited to second 
generation mobile. One cause of low penetration of second generation 
mobile in the US is the relatively high penetration rate of first generation 
mobile in this country. At the end of 1998 there were 50.7 million first 
generation subscribers in the US and Canada (using the analogue AMPS 
standard – Advanced Mobile Phone Service). However, this implies a 
penetration of 16.9 people per 100 in North America (KANO, 2000, p. 12).  As 
KANO (2000) notes, one of the reasons for the relatively low penetration rate 
of second generation mobile in the US was the fairly high rate of penetration 
of first generation. 
The figures for North America (mainly the US) pose an interesting puzzle 
since there are not many parts of the Infocommunications Industry where the 
US is behind (57):  Why does the US lag in mobile communications?    
KANO (2000) suggests several answers to this puzzle. The first is the lack 
of a single dominant standard in the US, unlike in Europe and Japan where 
one standard dominated. In Europe the dominant standard for second 
generation digital cellular mobile systems is GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communications), which has more subscribers than any other standard in 
 
(57) For an analysis of the causes of US global leadership in the computer, software, and  
microprocessor semiconductor industries, see MOWERY & NELSON (1999). 
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the world (58). In Japan the dominant second generation standard is PDC 
(Personal Digital Cellular). In the US on the other hand, where the principle 
was accepted that the adoption of standards should be left to the market, 
there were three incompatible second generation standards: ANSI-136 and 
ANSI-95 (American National Standard Institute) and cdmaOne (Code 
Division Multiple Access). Kano suggests that the lack of a single dominant 
standard in the US had several other undesirable knock-on effects: some 
operators and users adopted a wait-and-see attitude to see which standard 
would dominate; there was poor geographical coverage since the standards 
adopted by different operators were incompatible and did not provide 
interoperability, in turn leading to slower user adoption of mobile services; 
and large-scale production of equipment and phones was frustrated by the 
lack of a single standard, leading to high costs. 
However, Kano suggests that the US lag was not only due to the failure 
to provide a single dominant standard. There were several other reasons for 
the relatively slow diffusion of mobile communications in the US. To begin 
with, as already noted, the relatively rapid diffusion of first generation 
analogue mobile services in the US served to frustrate the take-up of second 
generation digital services. Furthermore, the specific characteristics of fixed 
telecoms services in the US also slowed the diffusion of mobile services.  
These included the arrangement that the called party, rather than the caller, 
paid for the call; the fact that a flat rate is paid for fixed local calls, making 
pay-per-call mobile calls relatively expensive; and the high cost of spectrum, 
sold by the US authorities by auction, that depleted investment resources for 
operators. To the extent that the flat rate for local calls was an inhibitor of the 
diffusion of mobile services in the US, it is ironical that the same tariffing 
system provided a significant boost for the diffusion of the Internet and that 
attempts are currently being made in Europe and Japan to imitate this 
system (even if at the cost of Internet congestion as a result of the low price 
of a scarce resource, namely Internet access). Even more ironical is the 
contrast between US’s failure to generate a single dominant standard in 
 
(58) In it interesting to note, apropos the point made earlier about dynamic increasing returns in 
mobile communications in Scandinavia, that the Conference on European Postal and 
Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT), that began work on specifying a pan-European 
digital standard in the early 1980s, decided in 1987/88 that GSM would become the European 
standard. This happened formally in 1992. GSM, however, incorporated a later version of the 
original Scandinavian mobile standard, NMT (Nordic Mobile Telephony) rather than continental 
European alternatives that were also proposed.  This occurred even though the Scandinavian 
standard was narrow band while the continental alternatives were broadband.  "This decision on 
the GSM standard was very important to the Scandinavian firms Ericsson and Nokia because 
GSM is based on technical solutions they had already been pursuing.  With this decision, they 
were leading the technical race, not close followers or imitators."  McKELVEY & TEXIER, 1999, 
p. 16. 
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mobile communications and the same country’s superb success in 
generating not only US but also global standards for the Internet, partially 
documented earlier in this paper. 
 The Four Forces of Competition 
Earlier in this chapter it was stated that the technological regime and the 
associated learning regime constituted one of the 'engines' driving the 
evolution of the Telecoms Industry.  The technological regime was defined in 
terms of the conditions surrounding the creation of knowledge and the 
opportunities and constraints regarding the use of that knowledge. The 
learning regime refers to the patterns and paths of learning that occur under 
the technological regime. One of the conditions 'surrounding' the creation of 
knowledge, which therefore is part of the technological regime, that has not 
been emphasised until now is the forces of competition. It is these forces 
that Schumpeter had in mind when he referred to the "fundamental impulse 
that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion", quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter, such as new consumer goods and new methods of 
production. 
In the Infocommunications Industry it is necessary to distinguish between 
four forces of competition: between products/services; between networks; 
between technologies; and between firms. Examples of competition in each 
of these four areas are, respectively, competition between telex, phone 
(mobile and fixed), fax, and e-mail; competition between copper cable/XDSL, 
optical fibre, and fixed wireless for local access; competition between TDMA 
and CDMA in second and third generation digital mobile; and competition 
between AT&T, WorldCom, and Qwest.  Competition in each of these areas 
may occur independently of competition in the other areas although 
sometimes there will be interdependencies between some or all of the areas. 
One area where both network and technological competition is strongest 
is in the local access market (including Internet access). Exhibit 14 shows 
the main competing networks and technologies providing local excess.  
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Exhibit 14.  Competing Networks and Technologies in the Local Access Market 
Network Technology Description 
Copper cable/XDSL Broadband over twisted-pair copper cable. 
Optical fibre Glass optical fibre cable 
Cable Coaxial cable 
Cellular mobile Radio network, user mobile 
Fixed wireless access Radio network, user not mobile 
Satellite Communication satellites 
Power Line Radio signals sent through regular electricity cables 
received through electricity sockets 
Laser access Uses low-powered laser beams 
The creators of the knowledge embodied in networks and technologies in 
any of these areas have to constantly do battle to keep up with parameters 
defined by the alternative competing networks and technologies. For 
example, second generation digital mobile  transmits data at 9.6 kilobits per 
second. Third generation digital mobile sends data at 2 megabits per 
second, a similar speed to ADSL. However, TeraBeam claims that its laser 
access technology will send data at 2 gigabits per second.  This competitive 
environment provides a powerful context, permeated by pressures and 
incentives, within which knowledge creation takes place. And a changing 
knowledge base provides an important engine of change. Moreover, as 
Schumpeter also pointed out, "competition acts not only when in being but 
also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks" 
(SCHUMPETER, 1943, p. 85). 
 Conclusion  
This paper has focused on two questions: How has the Telecoms 
Industry changed since the mid-1980s, when liberalisation began in Japan, 
the UK, and the US, and what are the causes of this change? How has the 
Internet affected the Telecoms Industry? 
In analysing the causes of change, particular emphasis was placed on 
the changing technological and learning regimes, that refer essentially to the 
processes of knowledge creation and use in the industry. However, while 
these regimes play the role of a Schumpeterian 'engine', powering the 
process of change, it was shown that financial markets and co-evolving 
consumer tastes and preferences also constitute important engines of 
change in the Telecoms Industry. Furthermore, through the analysis of the 
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Internet, it was seen how a paradigmatic transformation of the industry was 
brought about by a set of ideas, and associated technologies and services, 
that originally emerged from outside the Telecoms Industry, ideas that at first 
were vehemently rejected by the industry's technological representatives. 
A latent theme in this paper, that has thread its way through the analysis 
of the evolution of this industry, relates to the ability of the industry's 
participants to understand what is happening in the industry, and, in the light 
of their understanding, to adapt and act in what they believe is an 
appropriate way. At numerous junctures in the industry's evolution it was 
seen that the participants have confronted what was termed 'interpretive 
ambiguity', when currently available information left significant ambiguity 
regarding what should be inferred. Rather than 'rational' and smooth 
adjustment to 'given facts' we saw a mixture of responses. These ranged 
from decisive actions based on strong convictions, that subsequently turned 
out to be wrong (such as the original views of telecoms engineers regarding 
packet switching), to more hesitant and tentative conclusions (such as those 
of some financial analysts). The importance of interpretive ambiguity, and 
the role that it has played at key turning points in the evolution of the 
Telecoms Industry, suggests that it might be necessary for us as economists 
to review the way in which we understand the decision-making processes 
that are, together with selection environments, the ultimate drivers of 
evolutionary economic processes. 
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